Geopolitics, Commitment, and Alliance Dynamics: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the U.S.-Greenland Strategic Interaction

Recent geopolitical developments in the Arctic region have renewed strategic interest in Greenland, particularly from the United States. Statements and actions suggesting enhanced U.S. control over Greenland have generated diplomatic tensions involving Denmark, Greenland’s autonomous government, and broader alliance structures such as NATO. This paper employs a game-theoretic framework to analyze the strategic interaction between the United States and Denmark-Greenland, conceptualizing the episode as a Chicken-type deterrence game embedded within an alliance structure. By incorporating concepts of signaling, commitment, reputation, and endogenous payoffs, the study demonstrates how alliance formation and repeated interactions alter equilibrium outcomes over time. The analysis highlights that geopolitical outcomes are shaped not merely by relative power but by belief formation, credibility of threats, and coalition support. The paper contributes to the political economy literature by linking geopolitical signaling with economic and strategic payoffs, offering insights into the evolving nature of contemporary deterrence and alliance politics.