Department of Philosophy, Ekiti State University, Ekiti, Nigeria
Online published on 7 February, 2013.
This paper argues that if it is claimed that self-interest is the ground of moral obligation, then, such a ground cannot be construed to be non-moral. It is posited that it amounts to conceptual error to contrast self-interest (egoism) with morality since the former is itself a moral theory. In striving to promote his interest maximally, the egoist does not offend the demands of rationality, what is required of him is his readiness and preparedness to cooperate with other equally rational utility maximizers for the optimization of the collective or corporate interest. However, what is thus collectively achieved may still be said to be in the interest of the collectivity, in which case such joint efforts do not completely do away with the concept ‘self’ though it is now the collective ‘self’.
Self-interest, egoism, altruism, prisoner's dilemma, obligations utility maximization