1Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Eberly College of Business and Information Technology, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Indiana, USA
2Professor, Department of Accounting, Eberly College of Business and Information Technology, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Indiana, USA
3Professor, Department of Accounting, Eberly College of Business and Information Technology, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Indiana, USA
Online published on 15 January, 2016.
The paper examines the association between the number of Board of Director (BOD) members and earnings quality when stock options are expensed under SFAS 123 (R) as part of CEO compensation. The paper analyzes the effect of expensing CEO Stock options on earnings quality when the BOD size serves as a mitigating variable.
Data for the period of 2000–2009 was collected from three databases-The Execu Comp database on CEO compensation, Corporate Governance database provides BODnumber and Compustat for firm specific data. SFAS 123 (R) became effective in 2005; therefore, this study omits the year 2005. The study uses publically traded US firms and compensation data for its CEOs.
Multiple regression results support a positive association between expensing of stock options and earnings quality when firms have a large number of BOD members. Results are consistent with expectations established by prior research that compare earnings quality and BOD governance.
The study is conducted with US publically traded firms only.
Our findings contribute to the body of knowledge on CEO stock options compensation and earnings quality as well as BOD size and earnings quality, by showing that earnings quality is stronger when stock options are expensed as part of CEO compensation especially for the firms that have a larger BOD.
CEO compensation, Stock Options, Earnings Quality, SFAS 123 (R), Executive Compensation, Board of Directors, Corporate Governance
