Identifying Bottlenecks in Grassroots Governance-A Case from Odisha

The 74^th constitutional amendment was passed in the year 1996 in the Indian parliament, which made self-rule an achievable goal in tribal areas, better known as PESA (Panchayat Extension to the Scheduled Areas). This made the ideals of self-rule a distinct possibility in Scheduled Areas. The 1980s had heralded new thinking around the concepts of governance. Neo-liberal markets essentially demanded the loosening clutches of bureaucratic governance and greater flexibility of non-state players in governance (Rhodes, 1996). There was also the promise of the Directive Principles of the Indian constitution to usher in Gram Swaraj in line with Gandhian ideals. Thus, states were directed to make changes in their respective Gram Panchayat (GP) Acts to translate the central amendments into a concrete reality. But did this happen in reality? Was the concept of devolution of power actually compromised by negotiating with the basic tenets of the central law, in Odisha? An examination of the extent of devolution in scheduled areas in context of functions, functionaries and finances has been made to comprehend the situation of the grassroots governance in translating self rule to a reality in tribal areas. This paper has in discussion with Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) at the Gram panchayat level, looked at the major bottlenecks in making PESA functional at the Gram Sabha level. It finds how PESA has been reduced to such high levels of ambiguity in its very design, that it is impossible for a PRI leader to challenge the obfuscations, and still not comprehend his inability to translate it into reality.