A critical perspective of Khaunya et al., view on devolved governance in democratic decentralization for development in Kenya

Kenya promulgated a new constitution in August 2010, thereby bringing a new governance structure in the country, with devolution taking center stage. The premise was to improve governance of resources at the grassroots and catalyze development. However, given the challenges of actualizing devolution in Kenya as led Khaunya et al., (2015) to question whether devolved governance in Kenya was a false start in democratic decentralization for development. This paper re-examines the viewpoints of Khaunya et al., through a different theoretical framework; the principle of subsidiarity, the public choice theory, and the implementation theory. Drawing from these theories and documents County Budget Review and Outlook Papers (CBROPs) together with empirical evidence from published research works, the study finds that the national government was cautious on its approach towards devolution despite the Principle of Subsidiarity advocating for such. This was in the paper’s view a structural problem rather than a political imperative as argued by Khaunya et al., (2015) who holds that many officials in the center will inevitably resist relinquishing power and authority. However, contrary to Khaunya’s view, devolution is protected in the constitution and it is no longer a prerogative of the political establishment. Second, was the argument that local power holders resist the presence of a new government that competes for their authority and power or seek to co-opt the new government. The current paper contends that the power and responsibility of electing office bearers in the county governments resides in the plebiscite through direct suffrage, however, the national government has been reluctant to actualizing Chapter Six of the constitution which stipulates integrity of public officers when it comes to clearing individuals for eligibility in contesting for elective positions. Third, Khaunya et al., cited the inability to absorb some devolved functions as impeding the promise of democratic decentralization for development. The present paper found that contrary to the Principle of Subsidiarity, the structure of devolution in Kenya suggests that the national government holds the devolved functions in a “basket” and, therefore, retains the monopoly in devolution. This was likely informed by new public management model which the government subscribes to and whose aim is efficiency rather than democratic accountability. Therefore, in a departure from Khaunya et al., the current paper concludes that the real issues at hand are structural rather than political and can be largely addressed through a strong institutional framework and by citizens of the devolved governments actively playing their role in over sighting their executive.