Establishing a standard to ensure a highly effective and efficient Philippine national police custodial service unit in handling high-risk personalities

This study assessed the different aspects of the Philippine National Police Custodial Service Unit (PNP CSU) as a bases for the establishment of a standard to ensure it's highly effective and efficient in handling high-risk personalities. The study is qualitative descriptive research and made use of Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and Key Informant Interview (KII) in gathering the needed data among personnel of PNP CSU in Camp Rafael Crame, Quezon City, Philippines. The study sought answers to questions such as the current state of the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities, the concerns that affect the PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities, and the standards that may be proposed to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU in handling high-risk personalities.

The researchers applied triangulation. Documentary analysis was used which was subsequently complemented through focus group discussions with eight (8) PNP CSU personnel and five (5) former PUCs who were recently released from PNP CSU custody and validated via the key informant interview with twenty-nine (29) PNP CSU personnel and six (6) Staff Officers of HSS and LSS following Mckinsey's 7S model. The study revealed that there were several concerns from the respondents under each 7S element, and all these elements have to be considered together as interdependence among the elements is an essence of this model, and a change in one affects all others (mindtools.com). Strategy concerns were on the denial of requests for provision of additional personnel, denial of requests for equipment procurement, security plans may have been strictly implemented, but not all the time, and no regular review, rehearsal, and implementation monitoring-mechanism of security plans. On the structure, the concerns were PNP CSU personnel are being deployed for non-PNP CSU tasks despite its lack of personnel, and communications, and other concerns already addressed to Intelligence and Investigation Division, HSS are not acted upon outright by that Division but still passed on to PNP CSU. Regarding systems, the concerns were equipment unavailability, lack of a mechanism to ensure regular maintenance of equipment, no regular security plans rehearsal, and implementation monitoring, hesitation of PNP CSU personnel to conduct cell search; not all visitors are thoroughly searched, existing minimum ratio of escort of 1:1+1 to PUC during court hearings and similar activities involving the latter outside PNP CSU facility is oftentimes insufficient, and no faithful compliance on the submission of after activity reports incorporating lessons learned after each activity. Pertaining to shared values, the lone concern was small issues regarding duty shifts. There was likewise lone concern on the style of leadership, which pertains to the call for PNP CSU leadership to consider suggestions of teams. Concerning staff, the issue pertains to an insufficient number of personnel that may be assigned to the different positions in PNP CSU, its personnel are not included in combat duty pay beneficiaries, and barracks are likewise being used by PNP personnel of other units/offices. With respect to skills, the concerns were that not all personnel have skills on competency trainings and lack of programs for continuing trainings and education relevant to handling high-risk personalities.

Based on the findings of the study, conclusions were actually drawn per element of the Mckinsey 7S model that was found necessary in order to ensure the high effectiveness and efficiency of the PNP CSU. Therefore on strategy, it is necessary to ensure personnel sufficiency (minimum of 88 PNP CSU personnel), ensure equipment sufficiency (by providing PNP CSU with the minimum equipment identified in the proposed TEA and to ensure enhanced security (through semi-annual review and rehearsal of security plans; and strict implementation and monitoring). On structure, PNP CSU personnel's call to be spared from deployment to non-PNP CSU functions has to be considered. Regarding systems, there is a need to ensure ready availability of sufficient equipment with a mechanism to ensure proper maintenance, amend the minimum ratio of 1:1+1 escort to PUC to 150% of escorts to increase escorts, and make the requirement more definitive. Any fraction should be rounded off to the next higher number of security escorts; conduct security plan rehearsal, as may be-necessary; and ensure strict implementation and monitoring per activity. On shared values, adherence to PNP Core Values, good attitude, harmony, and accountability to guide the behavior and actions of PNP CSU personnel. Concerning style of leadership, sustain leadership style being practiced by PNP CSU leadership befitting the peculiarities of the situation and giving due consideration to the suggestions of subordinates. With respect to staff, filling-up of all vacant authorized positions in accordance with the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel of 88, including PNP CSU personnel among the beneficiaries of Combat Duty Pay or equivalent benefits/allowances, and ensuring the exclusive use by PNP CSU personnel of their barracks were found necessary. And on skills, programming and implementing relevant trainings are inevitable.

Given the foregoing findings and conclusions of the study, the adoption of the measures under each element of Mckinsey 7S of strategy, structure, system, shared values, style of leadership, staff, and skill is recommended. Under Strategy, it is recommended to ensure personnel sufficiency at PNP CSU (minimum of 88 PNP CSU personnel) - the Chief PNP CSU must submit a request for the Director, HSS who must, in turn, submit to the Directorate for Personnel and Records Management (DPRM) for the recruitment of new police officers (PO1) or the reassignment to PNP CSU of personnel from other PNP offices/units to improve the manpower of PNP CSU; Ensure equipment sufficiency (by providing PNP CSU with the minimum equipment identified in the proposed - Chief, PNP CSU must submit to the Director, HSS who must, in turn, endorse to the Directorate for Logistics (DL) the proposed TEA for the approval subsequent endorsement by the Chief PNP and the final approval by the NAPOLCOM. TEA will give a more concrete and compelling basis for the procurement and issuance of identified PNP CSU equipment (including the direly needed additional vehicles) for the use of the latter notwithstanding a change in PNP leadership; and Ensure enhanced security (through semi-annual review and rehearsal of security plans; and strict implementation and monitoring) - this will ensure that security plans are attuned and responsive to the demands and peculiarities of the changing time and circumstances. On Structure, PNP CSU personnel may be considered for deployment to non-PNP CSU functions but on the last priority basis - this will not only spare to some extent PNP CSU personnel from over exhaustion due to overwork but likewise will allow them to concentrate their efforts and energy to highly dangerous custodial functions. On Systems, ensure ready-availability of sufficient equipment with a mechanism to ensure proper maintenance - this will create the ideal situation where the PNP CSU has at its disposal vital equipment when the need arises and avoid the situation where it still has to request for their availability especially of vehicles from HSS or LSS in order to transport PUCs for court hearings, etc. or to rush them to the hospital during emergency medical conditions; 150% of escorts to PUCs during court hearings - being the minimum, any fraction should, therefore, be rounded off to the higher whole number of security escorts. This will also make more definitive and higher the ratio of security escorts to the number of PUCs as compared to the present of 1:1+1 which is rather confusing and not easily to understood; and Conduct security plan rehearsal, as may be necessary; and ensure strict implementation and monitoring per activity - this is to ensure mastery as regards the role of the respective members of the security contingents to expect a smooth execution of the security plan during its actual implementation. On Shared Values, adoption by PNP CSU of pro-God, pro-country, pro-people, pro-environment, good attitude, harmony, and accountability as its shared values - the PNP CSU emphasized here good attitude and harmony, despite that by implication the PNP core values when observed religiously would result necessarily to good attitude and harmony, this is because PNP CSU functions are highly dangerous. Yet, team efforts are critical, so its personnel must work hand-in-hand to ensure the accomplishment of its objectives. Accountability was added as a caveat to take full responsibility and be answerable over one's actions or inactions which deviate or fall short from its standards. On Style of Leadership, PNP CSU leadership to sustain leadership style being practiced befitting the peculiarities of the situation and giving due consideration to the suggestions of subordinates - this affirms that there is no single leadership style that is best applicable in all situations in PNP CSU; even autocratic leadership has its perfect time in PNP CSU leadership particularly in emergency situations where time defines the success or failure in its operation. However, when the situation allows, suggestions of subordinates should be considered given their expertise acquired through the length of their experiences in the discharge of PNP CSU functions. On Staff, fill-up all vacant authorized positions following the minimum number of PNP CSU personnel of 88 - this is to ensure that the PNP CSU will function smoothly as far as human resources is concerned. This necessitates putting the right person at the right job giving due regard to the preferences of the personnel as well as their career development; Include CSU personnel-among the beneficiaries of Combat Duty Pay or equivalent benefits/allowances - this will boost their morale that could translate to high-quality outputs; while PNP CSU is under an administrative mother unit (HSS) and it is not engaging in offensive actions in the discharge of its duties, the danger, however, is even higher in PNP CSU, if not the same as those in operational units of the PNP. It is a fact the inoffensive operation, the operating units dictate and control of at least the time, place, and manner of operation. Still, the PNP CSU is in the defensive position, and it is the lawless elements who wish to stage a rescue or ambush who are in the offensive position. When these lawless elements engage the PNP CSU, the latter cannot refuse combat as it is obligated to fight back at least a defensive combat. Therefore, PNP CSU is in a more dangerous position than those operating units of the PNP. Accordingly, PNP CSU personnel deserve combat duty pay entitlement. And ensure the exclusive use by PNP CSU personnel of their barracks - this is rather basic due to security reasons and to avoid unnecessary congestion in the barracks that runs contrary to habitability. And, on Skills, to program and implement relevant trainings for continuing skills development to PNP CSU personnel - this is very important since PNP CSU is handling high-risk personalities the danger against the lives of the security escorts as well as the PUCs is very high so higher level of competencies in handling high-risk personalities are really necessary to ensure a highly effective and efficient PNP CSU.