It has been argued that the modern democratic practice suffers from a paradox. While the democratic governments are expected to work in everyone's interests, the voters who elect these governments can vote according to their self-interests. That is, while voters can elect representatives for any reason of their own, the government so elected is expected to work only in everyone's favour. The resolution of this paradox has been sought in different ways. The pluralists have argued that this paradox is generated because of a mistaken definition of democracy; for them, democracy is nothing but a fair mechanism to resolve power-conflicts within a society. Others have suggested that it is the responsibility of the elected representatives to represent only the common interests, even if they have been elected by the voters on the basis of parochial reasoning. Others have argued that through constitutional checks and balances we could make sure that elected representatives work only in favour of the common good. After delineating all these alternatives, this paper will explore the resolution suggested by the deliberative democrats. Deliberative democracy theorists argue that through institutional tweaks we could make voters reflect on the common good itself. They believe that through public deliberation we could change voter preferences and bring them in line with the common interests. We will pursue the details of this particular alternative.
Democracy, Deliberative Democracy, Pluralism, Pluralism
