Assistant Professor, Center for Latin American Studies and at the Food and Resource Economics Department, University of Florida
Online published on 21 November, 2013.
This article analyzes the bargaining process that occurs when guerrillas kidnap individuals in a developing country. Anecdotal evidence is used to illustrate, the different strategies used by kidnapers to abduct, gather information and collect ransoms, as well as the organization required by the victim's family, and the potential strategies they can use. Importantly, I expose the rationale underlying the guerrilla's actions and responses of the victim's family that may determine the success or failure of the negotiation. For this purpose, I use a sequential bargaining game structure that takes into account not only monetary factors determining the path of the negotiation, but also multiple dimensions embedded in such a bargaining process. The main conclusion of the article is that negotiations about monetary ransoms in developing countries need to be based, not only on economic considerations, but also on a deep analysis of the political and socio-cultural condition of both kidnaper and the victim.
