aDepartment of Mathematics, Manonmaniyam Sundarnar University, Thirunelveli, Tamilnadu, India. E-mail: jagkans@yahoo.com
bDepartment of Mathematics, Kunthavai Natchiyar Govt College for Women(Auto), Thanjavur, Tamilnadu, India. E-mail: nirmalamanokar11@yahoo.com
1Corresponding author
Online published on 7 August, 2013.
In this paper, we have characterized absolutely stable friendship problems having a non empty core. This characterization has allowed us to state that if the core of an absolutely stable friendship problem is not empty, it contains a unique matching/mating in which all top ranked agents are mutually matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
The Friendship algorithm (TFA), Same Gender Stable Friendship Preference Problem (SGSFPP), Stability of True Friendship
