Introduction

pdc

Political Discourse

2395-22292582-2691

Prof. R S Yadav

pdc-2-1-001

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Energy Security Factor in India-Iran Relations

Yadav

R.S.

¹Prof. R. S. Yadav, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra

162016

21313

2016

IndianJournals.com

Introduction

Post–Cold war global order witnessed multifold changes of bizarre nature including re-conceptualization of security and increased importance to economic factor. Consequently, concept of energy security, with enhanced developmental traits, has acquired significance in the foreign policy orientations of major power centers in general and rising powers in particular. As a result, politics of energy resource rich countries, particularly the oil and natural gas producing states, have been affected in a significant manner. Therefore, in the foreign relations between the states, importing and exporting such energy, are bound to influence in a substantial manner. In this context, India and Iran are not exceptions, as their bilateral ties, in the contemporary times, are revolving mainly around the energy security factor.¹ It is because India is the second largest developing country (after China) in the world that is dependent on import of its energy resources from the outside world. With its projection of economic growth to the tune of 8–10 present of GDP, its demands for energy are bound to increase. On the other hand, Iran which is second largest producer of oil and gas in West Asia, needs market for its exports of these commodities. Therefore, they are bound to come close to each other.

To visualize energy security as a core issue between India and Iran, it is pertinent to understand what is really meant here by this concept. In simple term energy security means the availability of sufficient and uninterrupted supply of natural oil and gas at an affordable price. But this is very limited understanding of the concept. For proper perspective of this term, analysis of four broad dimensions related to energy security becomes inevitable. These are -(i) physical security– protecting the assets, infrastructure, supply chain and trade routes and making provision for quick replacement and substitution, when need be; (ii) access to energy — ability to develop and acquire energy supplies physically, contractually and commercially; (iii) well organized system – having coordination among national and international situations respond to disruptions, dislocations and emergencies to maintain steady flow of supplies; and (iv) investment – business climate to promote investments and development and innovation to ensure adequate supplies and infrastructure for timely future supplies.²

Framework of Bilateral Relations

Energy security relations between India and Iran can only be understood in an appropriate manner in terms of their overall framework of bilateral ties. Historically speaking, though their relations started with goodwill visits by their leaders and treaty of friendship between them; yet they cannot be termed as warm relations throughout the cold war era due to their opposite global foreign policy outlooks and regional alignments. Though there exists “civilizational affinities” and “historical linkages” between them,³ yet their relations have been “subject to complex pulls and pressures, convergences and divergences” throughout the years.⁴ Due to presence of Iranian delegation in Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi (March 1947), it was assumed that Iran is going to have smooth relations with independent India. But later actions of Iran did not justify such thinking. It is because, on the one hand, Iran was not only the first nation to recognize Pakistan and to establish formal diplomatic relations with it in May 1948, but also concluded a treat of friendship with it in 1949. On the other hand, it accorded formal diplomatic relations to India only in March 1950.Later on their opposite foreign policy outlooks in the form of non-alignment (India) and alliances (Iran) created further wedge between the two countries. However, normalcy returned to their relations during 1960s, but that was due to emerging détente between the then superpowers and not because of their improved bilateral understanding.

During 1970s, despite divergences in their thinking due to Iran's support to Pakistan in 1971 Indo-Pak war, relations between them improved in a substantial manner. During this period both emerged as regional powers in their own geopolitical sphere. If post-1971 war era witnessed the emergence of India as a regional power of South Asia, then post-1973 Arab-Israel war and surge of oil revenue also brought Iran as a regional power in the Gulf region. As a result, engagements between the two, especially in terms of economic cooperation, became inevitable. It was manifest from the bilateral visits of the leaders of the two countries. During this period, Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai paid their visits to Tehran in 1974 and 1977 respectively, and Shah of Iran paid his visit to New Delhi in 1978. But later developments in the form of Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979); Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979); and Iraq-Iran war (1980) derailed their bilateral ties. However, despite their difference on numerous political issues, both continue to maintain economic cooperation during the decade of 1980s. It was also a fact that up to this time their relations could not attain warmth due to cold war tensions in the region, rather than their bilateral differences.

However, significant transformations have been witnessed in their ties during the post-cold war era, especially by the late 1990s. With the end of cold war their relations converge due to several factors, such as: (i) issues of stability in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan; (ii) Security of oil supplies; (iii) checking the deleterious consequences of Wahabbist/Deobandi extremism emanating from the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere; and (iv) mutual benefit from economic cooperation in a broad swath of area.⁵ Convergence due to these factors can be visualized through their execution of bilateral affairs during this period. Main turning point in their relations can be traced has been the signing up of agreement on International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) in September 2000 along with Russia. This corridor can facilitate goods from St. Petersberg to Mumbai connecting large part of Russia, Central Asia and Iran. As part of this accord, India also agreed to help expand the Iranian port of Chabhar and lay railway tracks that can connect Chabhar to the Afghanistan's city of Zaranj.⁶ Later in march 2001, both also agreed to initiate security dialogue to examine key issues concerning these two states.⁷

More significant change, however, occurred in their relations when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Tehran in April 2001, which resulted in the signing of Tehran Declaration.⁸ Through this both the countries conveyed their deep concerns toward the developments in Afghanistan, particularly their apprehensions against international terrorism. As a result, interest of both converged due to shared threats and perceived opportunities, which compelled them to develop strategic cooperation in the areas such as: threats of terrorism (particularly from militant Sunni groups); security of sea lanes of control (Strait of Hormuz); and, integrity of energy supplies. Moreover, developments in Afghanistan further opened up the scope for new commercial and developmental opportunities for both India and Iran with other key collaborator such as Russia.⁹

With the signing of New Delhi Declaration during the January 2003 visit of President Khatami to New Delhi this process further got momentum.¹⁰ Besides the declaration, Iran also signed seven additional Memorandum of understanding with India which brought them more close to each other.¹¹ This not only strengthened their cooperation in the areas of science and technology, information technology, pharmaceutical, space, food security, hydrocarbon, water issue, education and training etc., but also brought them closer to cooperate against international terrorism and reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in Afghanistan. Two thing emerged out of this visit in a very prominent manner. One has been their “Road Map to Strategic Cooperation” for robust defense cooperation in the form of institutional defense linkages. As a result, both agreed to establish working groups on terrorism and counter-narcotic and to have joint naval exercise in the Persian Gulf. Second, both took concrete step to forge cooperation in oil and natural gas supplies from Iran to India through their commitment to expand hydrocarbon infrastructure. Both also agreed to expedite further development of Chahbhar port complex, Chahbhar-Fahranj- Bam railway link, and Marine oil Tanking Terminal. Consequently, Jalil Roshandel has rightly observed that from this partnership two countries have been benefitted in three ways: i)

First, each seeks more developed economic links, especially in the energy sector. India is a major importer country of oil and natural gas, and Tehran, with ample supplies of both, is eager to fulfill that need.

ii)

Second, both Tehran and New Delhi value augmented political cooperation in areas of common interest, starting from Afghanistan.

iii)

Third, the two hope for enhanced cooperation in the military sphere.¹²

Later on, emerging Indo-US closer ties on the one hand, and simultaneous rift between Iran-US relations on the other hand, created differences between India and Iran. As a result, India's voting against Iran in IAEA in 2005 and 2006 created further wedge between the two countries.¹³ Besides, imposed sanctions on Iran curtailed the trade and economic ties also. It was also a fact that despite sanctions, India continue to import oil from Iran, but the quantum of the import was quite low. Even India also hesitated to repay the dues of oil imports from Iran. Though Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh paid a visit to Iran during 16th NAM conference in 2012 and External Affairs minister Salman Khurshid visited in 2013, yet the warmth in their ties was missing due to sanctions on Iran. Modi's visit to Iran in May 2016, has to great extent restored the goodwill and provided momentum to their bilateral ties.¹⁴ This visit not only led to the finalization to develop the strategic port of Chabahar, but also agreed on a three-nation pact to build a transport-cum-trade corridor through Afghanistan to link further to Central Asia and Europe. These agreements have been visualized to “alter the course of history of the region”, remarked Prime Minister Modi. As a result, in the present deal, India agreed to spent about $500 million to develop the port in South Eastern Iran's Sistan-Baluchistan province as a regional trade hub. This is going to open up an alternative land-sea route for trade with Afghanistan. Besides, India will also invest another $500 million in phase-I, including $150 million in line of credit from Exim bank to the Iran's Maritime and Port Organization for making jetties and berths at Chabahar. Moreover, India's Ports Global will invest $85 million to develop two container berths with a length of 640 meters and three multi-cargo berths. Finally, Indian refiners Essar Oil and MRPL cleared $1.2 billion out of a total of $6.4 billion dues owed to Iran for crude oil imports and agreed to pay 1.5% interests on the remainder as a good will gesture. It is also speculated that now “India is keen to settle the entire oil dues, keeping in mind the emerging economic relationship with Iran”. Therefore, issue of energy security factor may be looked in the context of changing global politics vis-à-vis Iran; India's rising demand for energy; and, complex regional scenario in West Asia. Consequently, energy security issue between two can be analyzed in the changing framework of their bilateral relations.

Energy Security Factor

Slimultaneous to the political developments after detritus of Soviet Union and consequent end of cold war rivalry between the then superpowers, process of globalization became prominent in international relations. As a result, economic issues became important factor in relations among states. Both India and Iran were no exception to such phenomenon. Therefore, India initiated a process of economic reform to cope up with such exigency. This has given boost to substantial increase in the demand for hydrocarbon energy resources for its projected economic growth. Similarly Iran was also looking to gear up of its economy by boosting oil production from domestic sources, as well as, augmenting its capabilities from acquiring its share from the Caspian Sea oil reserves.¹⁵ Therefore, interests of India and Iran seem to have been converged on the issue of energy security. For India, to reach the projected target of 8 to 10 percent of growth of its GDP, it becomes essential to import huge quantity of oil, natural gas and nuclear fuel. Among the three segments oil is likely to remain the item of main concern affecting India's foreign policy in a substantial manner.¹⁶ Similarly, Iran, for its part, was both endowed with one of world's largest supplier of natural gas, as well as, oil, and desperate to find new markets for these products. Thus, “energy interest, with Iran as supplier and India as consumer, cemented Indo-Iranian relations and motivated both states to explore ways of getting Iran's hydrocarbons to India's market”.¹⁷ Therefore, in contemporary relationship energy security is going to work as linchpin in the bilateral ties between India and Iran.

Dimensions of Energy Cooperation

India-Iran energy relations can be explained through four-fold activities: (i) oil and gas supplies; (ii) oil and gas exploration; (iii) building of pipelines; and, (iv) development of infrastructure. (i)

Oil and Gas Supplies–As far as oil is concerned India has a domestic production of around 32 to 33 million tonnes, while its consumption is nearly 135 to 140 tonnes. Hence, it has become the third highest consumer of oil in the world. Accordingly as per the estimates by International Energy Agency (IEA) its energy demand is likely to increase from 669 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) in 2009 to 1464 mtoe in 2035. Thus demand for oil is likely to increase by 3.4% annually (from 3.3 million barrels per day in 2010 to 7.4 million barrel per day in 2035). This gap between demand and supply is increasing day by day. Such gap is being filled by India through import of oil from abroad. Out of the total imports nearly 70 percent of such import is from West Asia. This import is likely to enhance around 92 percent in 2035, with serious bearing on its import bill. On the other hand, Iran is the second highest producer of oil in West Asia. If India's imports are calculated, nearly 10 percent of its imports comes from Iran. Similarly natural gas is the most environment friendly and economic fuel available for sustainable development both for developed and rising powers. Iran is the world's largest holder of natural gas and owns 27 trillion cubic meters (i.e. 15.8%) of world's reserves. It has availability of its large amount for exports to the outside world in the form of either liquefied natural gas (LNG) or via pipelines. Given India's economic development it is going to be one of the main importers of natural gas. India's proven gas reserves are 1.12 trillion cubic meters which is 0.6% of the world's proven reserves and this is likely to last for 32 years at current production levels. Its likely consumption by 2025 may reach 2.8 trillion cubic feet (tcf). Hence Iran can be one of its important sources of such imports.

(ii)

Oil and Gas Explorations — ONGC, Government of India's sole company under Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, is solely looking to the domestic production of oil and natural gas. Since domestic reserves are not sufficient then its overseas company OVL (ONGC Videsh Limited) is busy in acquisition of acreage in other countries. Since its inception in 1965, OVL has been entrusted with the task of exploration, development and production of oil and gas abroad. It has a success story of producing 8.36 MMT of oil and oil equivalent of gas by 2013–14 from a meager production of 0.252 MMT in 2002–03. Now it is participating in 33 oil and gas assets in 16 countries and contributing to 14.5% and 8% of oil and natural gas production of India respectively.18 It has adopted a balanced approach by combining producing, discovering, exploration assets and pipelines assets. At present it has 13 producing assets in Russia, Syria, Vietnam, Colombia, Sudan, Venezuela, Brazil and Azerbaijan; 4 assets of hydrocarbons have been discovered, which are at different stages of development; 14 assets are under stages of exploration phase; and 2 pipeline projects are under operation for transportation of oil and gas.¹⁹ Since, Iran has huge potential for development of its gas fields and transportation of LNG through pipelines, it definitely can take benefit of India's such expertise. Moreover, geographical proximity and convergence on numerous issues in Central and South Asia can bring them closer to each other.

(iii)

Building of Pipelines — Oil and natural gas supply between India and Iran can be operationalized through building of pipelines. Presently both are tackling the issue of connectivity through following modes: (a)

International North – South Transport Corridor (INSTC) – This Russian initiative linking Mumbai with St. Petersburg via Tehran and Moscow was signed in September 2000 by India, Iran and Russia. Later on 11 other countries, including all the states of Central Asia joined the initiative, making it an ambitious project supported by 14 states.²⁰ This project envisages a multi-model transport network that connects ports in India's West coast to Bandar Abbas in Iran by sea, then overland by road and rail networks to Bandar Anzali Caspian Seaport and thence through Rasht and Astara on Azerbaijan borders to Kazakhstan and further towards Russia. A long road rail stretch will run to St. Petersburg, the Russian port on the Baltic Sea, through Volgograd and Moscow. This corridor is thus much more than a link for oil and gas supplies between India, Iran and Russia. Moreover both Iran and India can use it not only for their bilateral supplies, but also for connecting the supplies from whole of Central Asia.

(b)

Iran-Pakistan-India(IPI) Gas Pipeline – Proposal of construction of Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline has been major energy security concern for all the three states in general and between India and Iran in particular.²¹ On 15 February 2002 construction of 2700 kilometers of gas pipeline linking Iran's South Pars field in the Persian Gulf to Pakistan's major cities of Karachi and Multan and further to New Delhi was announced. The total length of this pipeline would run 1100 kilometers in Iran, 1000 kilometers in Pakistan and 600 kilometers in India and will be completed with an estimated cost of US $700 billion. Through this pipeline an estimated 110 million cubic meter gas a day is envisaged to be supplied, starting initially with 30 million cubic meters. This pipeline is going to benefit all the stake holders in a significant manner.²²

(c)

There is another possibility to Import Iranian gas to India is deep-sea pipeline. This option has technical difficulties in the construction and maintenance of a pipeline lying on the mountainous seabed, three thousand below the surface of the sea. Even the expected cost would be around US $ 4.5 billion. New Delhi soon is likely to sign such agreement with Tehran to build a 1400 kilometer pipeline, bypassing EEZ of Pakistan. This pipeline is likely to supply 31.5 million standard cubic meters gas per day to India's West Coast. Along with direct supply it will facilitate India's linkages with Afghanistan and Central Asia through Iranian port of Chabahar. Simultaneously supplies through INSTC can also be linked through this pipeline. Success of this project can be visualized now as US has lifted sanctions on Iran in January 2016.

(d)

Another area of India-Iran cooperation has been the supply of liquefied natural gas (LPG) by Iran to India. For that matter, in January 2005 both signed an agreement by which Iran will export 7.5 million tonnes of LNG per annum to India for the next 25 years started in 2009.²³ Though after India's vote against Iran in IAEA in 2005, the latter threatened to revise its economic relations with India, yet with the end of sanctions by the US and EU in January 2016, decks are clear for Iran's supply of LNG to India. Although, India is already getting LNG from Oman and Qatar at its terminals in Gujarat since 2004, yet it is also developing new terminals at Kochi. Perhaps India is gearing itself for the imports of LNG from Iran.

(iv)

Development of Infrastructure — To strengthen their areas of cooperation in oil, natural gas and LNG supplies, both have also been engaged in the related infrastructural development activities. Prominent activities in this regard have been India's engagement to develop Chabahar port complex; Chabahar-Fahranj-Bam railway link; and, Marine Oil Tanking Terminal in Iran. India has already committed US $100 million for the development of Chabahar port and is willing to make investments for the development of its container terminal and railway networking projects. It is also presently negotiating with Iran to find another railway link between Chabahar Port city to the city of Zahedan, located at the tri-junction of Iran- Afghanistan- Pakistan. This rail route after completion is likely to benefit India in two ways: One, it will join Chahabar Port with INSTC to provide direct access to Central Asia as well. Two, it will also be used to establish greater links with Afghanistan as the India- built 200 Kilometer long Zarang- Delaram road in that country is closer to Zahadan. Since Zaranj- Delaram hooks up with Afghanistan's ‘Garland Highway’ linking all major cities, then present rail link can also be benefited from that connectivity. Thus, both India and Iran are collaborating in such infrastructures which can facilitate long term energy cooperation between them.

Limitations

Current geo-politics of energy security in Asia may result in developing either cooperation or antagonism between two powers, i.e, India and China. On the one hand, India's developments of Chabahar port and trilateral agreement to establish a land transit and trade route through 218 Kilometers Zarang-Delaram road and finally to garland highway of Afghanistan is perceived as anti-dote to the Sino-Pak development of Gwadar. On the other hand, China's efforts to develop economic corridor in Pakistan up to Gwadar may dovetail its ultimate object to link Chabahar in to its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. It is because China can provide more investments for such projects as compared to India. Besides, China is also end user for oil and gas to be exported from Iran. Moreover, Iran has also not ruled out that trilateral agreements on Chabahar is for the exclusive bilateral use by India and Iran, rather lather's laissez faire attitude on the issues leaves ample scope of its use by other states as well.²⁴ Thus, India has to develop a critical view about Iran's attitude towards itself and China on the issue, as well as, India-China cooperation on imports of oil and natural gas from Iran.

India is to caution about America factor in its bilateral ties with Iran. Despite removal of sanctions from Iran, regional politics of the area continue to have the USA's involvement. Simultaneously, Indo-US relations are proceeding towards the consolidation of their ties both at bilateral and global levels. In this context, Iran would certainly look towards their ties insulated from Indo-US and India-GCC ties. Moreover, USA's deal with Iran is still on papers. In operational terms neither the economic institutions nor its corporate investments in Iran is visible. Even its financial institutions are not processing payments related to Iranian oil and the Central Bank of Iran. In this context, strengthening of Indo-US ties in Indo-Pacific and other regions create doubts about India's policy orientation towards Iran. Thus, India has to develop a critical balance in pursuit of its energy security policy vis-a-vis its relations with two suspicious, if not antagonist, friends Iran and the USA.

Another problem area has been India's management of relationship with both Shia Iran and Sunni GCC backed Saudi Arabia. It is because Iran and GCC had both ideological and territorial rivalries between them. Nuclear aspiration of Iran and current happenings in Syria have further complicated their ties. On the other hand, like Iran, GCC are important for India as it imports nearly two-third of its oil from these states and exports large quantity of manufactured goods to these states. Moreover, nearly six million Indians are working in Gulf region and contributing huge remittances back home. Because, India's emerging defense cooperation with Israel can also work as an irritant in its bilateral ties with Iran. Thus, both need to understand the sensitivities of each other and develop their ties by understanding complexities of the policies of gulf region.

To develop oil and natural gas infrastructure particularly in Chabahar complex investments are a serious challenge which India need to handle. Though during Narendra Modi's Iran visit in 2016, India promised to commit an investment of US $500 million for trade and transit corridor and to spent US$ 16 billion to build Chabahar Free Trade Zone in the coming years. Number of India's private and government companies have shown interests in setting up of infrastructural projects there. But China is equally interested in the developments of projects in Iran with huge investments. There are reports that China and Pakistan have already expressed their keenness to join Chabahar with Gwadar. China is all set to launch its industrial town project as part of its commitment to develop Chabahar port city. It has already decided on a location for the project and will be developing the free trade zone in a phased manner.²⁵ Besides, such kind of interest have also been shown by European Union, Japan, South Korea etc. as well.²⁶ Hence, India has to compete with all these countries in terms of investments in this region. Therefore, India may face tough time to in procuring investments in the region.

Another problem is related to the factors and forces of domestic politics affecting the economic affairs of the country. In this context, role of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) need to be considered as very vital. On the one hand, IRGC is important component in the working of Iranian economy; whereas, on the other hand, this organization continue to fall under US scanner of sanctions.²⁷ It is because, its role in Iranian politics cannot be ruled out as many members of Iranian Parliament – Majlis – are former Revolutionary Guards. Moreover, article 147 of the Iranian constitution categorically endorses IRGC's role in the economic activities of the country.²⁸ Though at the moment stakes of IRGC in Chabahar SEZ and port development work is not there, yet possibility of its future interventionist role is also not ruled out. Thus, at present India's has very positive response from Iran, yet change in domestic politics in future need to be visualized in advance.

Doubts about the operationalization of Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline is also raised due to Indo-Pak bilateral relations and negative developments in the region. India-Pakistan relations have always been far from friendly and they are likely to remain so in near future as well. In this context, construction, safety and security of the pipeline cannot be ensured. Given the geo-political scenario, China's initiative of One Belt One Road (OBOR) and development of Gwadar port, have further add complexity to this situation. For the success of such proposal minimum level of confidence-building among states are required, which seems missing between India and Pakistan at the moment.

Conclusion

India-Iran energy security relations, thus, can be visualized in the changed context of emerging regional and global order in the post-cold war era. It is a fact that old non-alignment is history now and so is the belief of US supremacy.

Hence, their future ties are likely to depend on how India balances its relations with US and Israel on the one hand and Iran on the other hand. Similarly, it also depends on how Iran handles the emerging non-traditional threats in the region to enhance peace and stability in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Besides, convergence on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and avoidance of s weapon orientation by Iran is essential in strengthening of their bilateral ties. Therefore, both countries have to chalk out their foreign policy moorings in the context of regional engagements in multi-polar world order, so that convergence in their interests can be attained. In this context, energy supply and its related infrastructural arrangements can play significant role in their future relationship.

However, in this context, strong compatibility exists between the two in terms of three-fold bilateral compulsions to come close to each other. First, energy factor is very important in terms of supplier and importer relationship. This factor becomes all the more important because India is heavily dependent on Iranian crude oil. As many of Indian oil refineries are configured in a manner to process only heavy crude oil of which Iran is a major supplies. Moreover, since there are not much substitute volumes readily available in the global market, hence India is likely to depend on Iranian oil at least for some time. Second, peace and stability in the region of Central Asia and Afghanistan is crucial for both of them. Finally, to deal with the problem of non-traditional threats and narcotic drug trafficking menace are vital for both the states. Therefore, need for both to re-energies their economic cooperation, along with enhanced connectivity, are vital concern in future relationship between both the states. Consequently, energy security factor is likely to play significant role between India and Iran at least for time being. The more positively both are able to resolve h irritants in their energy security arrangements, there are increased possibility of warm relations between them in times to come.

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