Introduction

pdc

Political Discourse

2395-22292582-2691

Prof. R S Yadav

pdc-2-1-009

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Siachen Impasse in India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis

Singh

Surender

¹Dr. Surender Singh, Assistant Professor of Political Science, R.K.S.D. (PG) College, Kaithal, Haryana

162016

21101108

2016

IndianJournals.com

Introduction

At present South Asia exists uncertain between the fear of tragic devastation and anticipation for a better life between the states of this region, because two hostile countries like India and Pakistan are situated here. The story of India-Pakistan relations has been a long series of discord and conflict. This issue of discard, if analysed objectively, indicates a general problem of mutual suspicion and distrust between them. An asymmetry in terms of geo-physical and military capabilities has further added to this mistrust. There always exists a continuity and change in the India-Pakistan relations, as they are based on hatred, bitterness, rivalry and sense of animosity. For creating such a scenario numerous variables have played their significant role. Some of these variables are quite perceptible, such as relating to their size, economic, human resource-base, military strength, geographical position etc. while others are intangible, relating to the past history, national interests, identity, image, status of conflicts, objectives and ideological legacy.¹ This historical legacy of rivalry, continuation of conflict on different problems, weakness of institutional arrangements, disunity of their political and economic structures, existence of incipient arms race etc. not only likely to threatens security of the region, but also reduces the benefits of regional integration.² The relationship of these forces provides an appropriate focus to understand their divergent attitudes towards various issues.

In the relations of India and Pakistan deep hostility continues to shadow positive development. Armed forces of both used to confront across a lengthy and unstable border, reflects mutual mistrust. Increasing terrorist activities and nuclearisation of both the states have added another dangerous dimension in their relationship.³ That is why both countries are maintaining largest armed forces in the world. Besides, the region is facing a wide range of internal security threats, such as sectarian and ethnic violence; communal strife; insurgent movements; and, socio-economic and environmental problems. This scenario stands in sharp contrast to the emerging world trends of de-escalation of tension and rapprochement between nations.⁴ South Asia, thus, defies the logic of cooperation. Therefore, conflict prevention and resolution is foremost priority for this region. However, India-Pakistan relations never witnessed the trajectory of constant retrogression; rather it revealed a mixed patchwork of growth and backwardness. They have been seriously involved in working out rapprochement on all problems. Though, all efforts to solve the problems failed, yet some issues simply moved towards resolution.⁵ Both have signed many agreement among them, but these agreement never followed in letter and spirit. Therefore, it is imperative that both countries should ensure the trustworthy implementation of all earlier agreements.⁶ Thus, India-Pakistan relations have become so visions that even engaging them in discussion is not beyond doubts. Therefore for the success of dialogue and peaceful resolution of disputes between them require flexibility to accommodate the concerns of both the states.

Siachen Impasse

Siachen glacier is considered a major irritant, which has seriously affected India-Pakistan relations. The glacier is considered as the highest and coldest battlefield on the earth and has been an area of conflict between India-Pakistan for over thirty years. India's claim to Siachen is based on its regular patrolling of the area since 1950. On other hand, Pakistan's claim is based on its authority to have conducted mountaineering expeditions in the region.⁷ This glacier situated between Saltoro and Karakoram ranges and it is 76 kilometres long and varies in width between 2 to 8 kilometers.⁸ Due to its strategic location sometime this glacier is also termed as ‘Third Pole’.⁹ It is the second largest glacier in Asia, the first being the 77 kilometers long Fedchenko in the Pamirs. At the head of the glacier lies a pass called Indira col. a 5760 meter high point at sea level.¹⁰ It is surrounded by snow covered mountains and the temperature drops routinely to minus 40 degrees centigrade and even lower in winter. It has witnessed numerous causalities due to unfavourable climatic circumstances and rather than military skirmishes. The conflict is also putting a vast financial burden on the national exchequer of both countries. In winter, Siachen glacier is cut off from the rest of the world and impossible to reach but only in summer, troops can reach in this area by helicopters.¹¹

Strategic located makes it very important to India as well as Pakistan and China. Because, in the east of the glacier lies Tibet-Sinkiang road through Aksai Chin and in the north 537 mile-long Karakoram highway is built across the Khunjerab Pass, which gives easy access to the Chinese to reach the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and Africa.¹² If the extension of the Karakoram highway reaches up to Aksai Chin, it will give Pakistan an easy access to the Nubra valley. Such positioning of Pakistan is going to be a great threat not only for India's security, but it also provides a big challenge to maintain its position in Siachen and Ladakh region. That is why; India is trying to strengthen its hold over the Siachen region. At present, India is in a commanding position and the entire region is completely under its control since 1983. The height of some Indian forward bases on the Saltoro Ridge range from Kumar (16,000 feet), Bila Top (18,600 feet), Pahalwan (20,000 feet) and Indira Col (22,000 feet). On the other hand, Pakistan's position is comparatively at a lower height in the glacier area, ranging between 9,000-15,000 feet.¹³ However, the Siachen glacier is very difficult to access from Pakistani side. From Gilgit to Skardu one has to travel up to the Indus Valley and thence up the river Shyok to Khapalu and thereafter across a series of glaciers.¹⁴ It is little easier to access this glacier from Indian side. A truck from Leh goes all the way up the Nubra Valley to the snout of the glacier only 40 kilometers from the road head at Sasowa.¹⁵

The roots of the conflict over Siachen lie in the non-demarcations of boundary between India and Pakistan in that area. Originally Siachen was considered to be entirely uncongenial and not worth any conflict on the ground. It is situated on the north and north-eastern side of PoK. The United Nation Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) with the help of military experts was able to draw a cease-fire line (CFL) up to grid Point NJ 9842 beyond Kargil near a place called Chalunka, and saying that it runs northwards along the glaciers thereafter.¹⁶ But the Karachi Agreement of July 1949 accepted by India and Pakistan did not cover the area of the glaciers for two reasons. First, non-demarcation of the area was distance of the region and lack of knowledge of the technicalities of delineation at such high altitudes. Second, no demarcation of the region was the approach of both the states. As, on the one hand, Pakistan did not bother much about extending the CFL thinking that the whole of Kashmir would sooner or later be a part of Pakistan. Whereas, India, on the other hand, seems to have thought since there was no fighting in that region, it would continue to remain peaceful and delineation would be done at a later stage when the final decision regarding Kashmir issue takes place.¹⁷ When the CFL was changed into a mutually accepted Line of Control (LoC) in October 1972, the prospect of demarcating the LoC in this region was frittered away. According to this agreement, the newly demarcated line ran from the Shyok River west of Thang to Point NJ 9842. Thus, the agreement did not clearly mention that who controlled the region and left an unclear demarcation of the territory.¹⁸ This is the main basis that Pakistan and India have attempted to stake their territorial claims by interpreting the vague language contained in the 1949 and 1972 agreements to confirm their individual points. India draws a north westerly line from NJ 9842 along the watershed line of the Saltoro Range, a southern outcome of the Karakoram Range. Pakistan, on the other hand, thence northwards means from NJ 9842 up to Karakoram Pass.¹⁹

Before 1984 neither India nor Pakistan had any permanent presence in the region and border in the area remained peaceful. Even during wars the Siachen glacier region remained more or less unaffected. But a diverse kind of warfare started in the area for two reasons. First, in 1970s and 1980s several international maps had begun to show the Siachen glacier as part of Pakistan. Second, Pakistan started encouraging mountaineers to scale the difficult peaks in the region and permitted them to cross Indian Territory from its sides. Thus, alarmed by the reports of expeditions and publications of wrong maps, policy planners in India took this orographic challenge seriously.²⁰ Therefore, the beginning of the Siachen dispute in bilateral relation was visible in April 1984, when the Indian army and air force in a joint operation code-named ‘Meghdoot’ was initiated in this area and controlled the key peaks in the region. The operation ‘Meghdoot’ triggered armed clashes between forces of India and Pakistan which eventually led to situation of dispute.²¹ The Indian forces climbed to the Saltoro Ridge for a particular military objective. This was to cut of Pakistan access to the region that would enable it to reach the Karakoram Pass and link with China and be able to threaten Ladakh. The Saltoro Ridge provided strategic heights to India to watch into Pak-occupied Gilgit and Baltistan.²² This unexpected Indian action led to the beginning of a highly expensive altitude military struggle for supremacy in the region.²³ Presently both have stationed a considerable number of troops on the Siachen glacier and spend large sums of resource to maintain their position in this area.

Constant dialogue has assumed to prevent conflict ever since the eruption of hostilities. After the deployment of Indian military in the region, flag meetings, between the sector commanders of both India and Pakistan were held in 1985, but ended with little success. Later, numerous high-level negotiations have been held between Defense and Foreign Secretaries and the senior military officers of both the countries. But nothing has been achieved. After the fifth round of negotiations between Defense Secretaries of India and Pakistan in June 1989, an understanding was initially reached to resolve the dispute, when both countries have issued a joint statement. Here in principal both agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement of the dispute. But this accord on the Siachen also ended in fiasco because both the states could not agree on the modalities i.e. demilitarisation first or delimitation of the boundary first.²⁴ In November 1992, after the sixth round of the Defense Secretary negotiations, both countries had agreed to create a zone of complete disengagement and mutual withdrawal of troops from key passes to new positions. The agreement also allegedly included assurances by both countries to abstain from reoccupying vacated positions.²⁵ Though both seemed to have reached a near agreement, yet the deal was never operationalised because of differences between political leadership.²⁶

Later, during seventh round of negotiations in November 1998 at New Delhi, both anticipated many proposals without any agreement. India projected a package of CBMs which would lead to a comprehensive ceasefire in the Saltoro Range. But Pakistan insisted on to address the question of troop disengagement in the region.²⁷ Thus, both states, not only failed to implement these tentative agreements, but also fail to agree on any concrete agreement. With the beginning of peace process both resumed negotiations at the Defence Secretary level in 2004 after a gap of six years. They again agreed to discuss the modalities for disengagement and redeployment of troops in this region.²⁸ As a result, ninth round of talks between the defence secretaries took place in May 2005, in which both states agree to continue the ceasefire in the region.²⁹ Later on Manmohan Singh visited Siachen Glacier. While addressing the troops he remarked that, “The time has come that we make efforts that this battlefield is converted into a peace mountain but he added, however, that there could be no redrawing of boundaries for reasons of security and prestige”.³⁰ The then Northern area Commander Lieutenant General M.L. Chibber also admitted that “the strategic importance of the area was not a major consideration, nor was our purpose to capture any territory. It was simple to ensure that we were not presented with a fait accompli like that in Aksai Chin in early fifties”.³¹

Later in March 2006, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had offered a ‘treaty of peace, friendship and security’³² to Pakistan also hinted that the dispute over the Siachen glacier can be resolved soon. Simultaneously, Pakistan also claimed that discussions to demilitarize the Siachen region have reached in its final stage.³³ But no final agreement was reached because of mutual suspicion. Even today, both have not reached a single draft agreement about the Siachen Glacier. Discussions are on to finalise the modalities for the confirmation of the present troop positions, which may pave the way for the demilitarisation of the world's highest battleground.³⁴ It is assessed that government of India is considering an impulsive withdrawal of forces from the Siachen glacier region as part of a deal for demilitarisation of this area.³⁵ In May 2006 dialogue did not materialise because Pakistan was no longer interested in demarcating the actual ground position line.³⁶ Thus, demarcating of AGPL and demilitarisation of Siachen has not been done by both the countries.

On the occasion of death of 138 Pakistani soldiers on 7 April 2012, Pakistan's Army General Ashfaque Kayani rightly observed that both sides are paying a high price in blood, treasure and environmental costs.³⁷ He also viewed that defence without development is neither viable nor acceptable.³⁸ He emphasised that Siachen dispute can be taken as an imperative starting point. India also manifested its willingness for mutual pullback and redeployment of troops to agreed positions in case Pakistan acknowledges the present AGPL.³⁹

Thus, Siachen issue can be considered as a major step to building trust and confidence among India-Pakistan if both sides agree to formalise it through a MoU. This can be accompanied by a Helsinki-type political agreement that either state will not modify borders by use of force and will forever spirit of Simla Agreement.⁴⁰ A solution to the Siachen is essential in terms of financial, ecological and controlling of waste in this region. In this regard, both states have to adopt a give and take formula to negotiate and keep themselves engaged in positive dialogue. It is because issue of Siachen cannot be determined by military means only. Besides, India and Pakistan have to introspect about frustrations of their military forces, which live in a region of paramount strategic and security attention of both the states. It can be overcome only by stimulating the basis of democratic values and political dialogue by all accessible means. India must also have the patience and grit to counter all Pakistani efforts aimed at disrupting the political processes. In short, the difficulties in the way of resolving the Siachen problem are enormous and it may continue to remain a flash point for a considerable period. Hence, both states need to invest to reduce trust deficit between them.

Conclusion

Thus, resolution of Siachen conflict can play significant role in eliminating the distrust between India and Pakistan. The recent engagement among them can certainly check the political and diplomatic abilities of the two countries, but patience is needed for smooth conduct of such activity. Hope of preferred results lie in the nature of the peace process and the scope it can comprehend. This can be boosted further by the announcements of unilateral measures by their political elites so that a climate of mutual confidence and self-reliance can be encouraged. It is fact that now both states have reached a stage that such scenario can have serious bearings on social, economies and political development of both countries. The people are tired of this stressful atmosphere in the region. In such a situation, it is inevitable that the issues related to security are dealt with a sensible and intelligent way rather than as a tool to promoting political objectives. For the success and continuation of the peace process, it is necessary to remove the bottleneck in the way of resolving long standing disputes. So, the difficult problems may be set aside and priorities should be given to those issues which are soft and less politically volatile. Optimism by building blocks for effective linkages between both countries is the need of hour. Peace between India-Pakistan will remain elusive, unless and until, both states develop mutual confidence and trust. Therefore, there is a great need to replace old thinking, ideas and mindsets by new ones. It will not only grant the fuel to the peace process, but also provide the opportunity to interact at various levels to resolve the long standing disputes between them.

References1

Shukla

S P

India and Pakistan: The Origins of Armed Conflict, Deep & Deep, New Delhi, 1984, pp.1-2.

Uma

Singh

“India-Pakistan Relations in a Historical Perspective”, World Focus, vol.22, no.10-11-12, October-November-December2001, pp.32-37.

Jasjit

Singh

“War Clouds Over India-Pakistan?”, World Focus, vol.22, no.10-11-12, October-November-December2001, pp.6-8. Also see,

Roy

J N

“Indo- Pak Relations: Uncertain Prospects”, Dialogue, vol.5, no.3, January-March2004, p.131.

Talat

Masood

“Confidence Building Measures: Concept and Application”, in

Moonis

Ahmer

ed., The Challenge of Confidence-Building in South Asia, Har- Anand, New Delhi, 2001, p.28.

Balraj

Puri

“Muti-Dimensional Dialogue on J&K”, World Focus, vol.23, no.10-11-12, October-November-December2002, pp.42-44.

Maqudul Hasan

Nuri

, “CBMs in South Asia: Practice, Problems and Prospects”, Regional Studies, vol.XIV, no.2, Spring 1996, pp.57-58.

Noorani

A G

Easing the Indo-Pak Dialogue on Kashmir: CBMs for Siachen, Sir Creek, and the Wullar Barrage Dispute, Occasional Paper, no.16, Stimson Centre Henry L, Washington DC, 41994, pp.5-18. Also see, Samina

Ahmed

and Varun

Sahani

“Frozen Frontline”, Himal, vol.11, no.12, 121998, pp.16-17.

Ashutosh

Misra

“An Audit of India-Pakistan Peace Process”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.61, no.4, 122007, p.513.

Sharma

S C

“Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan”, in

Kamath

P M

ed., India-Pakistan Relations: Courting Peace from the Corridors of War, Promilla, New Delhi, 2005, pp.286-287.

Pasricha

P M

“The Siachen Glacier: An Orgraphic Offensive by Pakistan”, Strategic Analysis, vol.IX, no.9, 121985, p.855.

Jaswinder

Kumar

Irritants in Indo-Pak Relations, Abhishek, Chandigarh, 1989, pp.62-63.

Surendra

Chopra

Post-Simla Indo-Pak Relations: Confrontation to De- Escalation, Deep & Deep, New Delhi, 1988, p.177.

Sajad

Padder

“The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan: Structure, Process and Agency”, Accessed on 342016, URL: http://www.archiv,ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/13143/1/Heidelberg- Paper_65_Padder.pdf

Surendra

Chopra

“India-Pakistan Relations in 1990s”, in

Yadav

R S

ed., India's Foreign Policy Towards 2000 AD, Deep & Deep, New Delhi, 1993, p.69.

Pasricha

P M

“The Siachen Glacier: An Orgraphic Offensive by Pakistan”, Strategic Analysis, vol. IX, no.9, 121985, p.855.

Kanti

Bajpai

, et.al

Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy, Har-Anand, New Delhi, 2001, p.200. Also see, “The Siachen Question”, The Tribune, 2052006.

Chopra

n.14, p.70.

John

Cherian

“Spotlight on Siachen”, Frontline, 3071999.

Padder

n.13.

Chopra

n.14, pp.178-179.

Bajpai

n.16, p.201. Also see,

Kamla

“The Siachen Glacier Impasse”, Third Concept, vol.25, no.297, 112011, pp.19-22.

Vikram

Sood

“Height of Folly”, Hindustan Times, 1152006. Also see,

Vijay

Oberoi

“No Compromise on Siachen”, The Tribune, 1652006.

Sangeeta

Thapliyal

“Indo-Pak Conflict and the Role of External Powers”, Strategic Analysis, vol.XXII, no.7, 101998, P.1077.

Siddharth

Varadarajan

“Verify, but Trust, is the Best Formula for Siachen Pullout”, The Hindu, 2052006. Also see,

Wirsing

Robert G

“The Siachen Glacier Dispute: Can Diplomacy Untangle It?”, in

Afsir

Karim

ed., Indo-Pak Relations: Viewpoints 1989–1996, Lancer, New Delhi, 1996, pp.76-87.

Wirsing

Robert G

India, Pakistan and Kashmir Dispute, MacMillan, London, 1994, pp.210-214. Also see,

Atul

Anneja

“Siachen Accord Envisages a Thaw”, The Hindu, 2831997. Also see,

Prem

A C

“The Siachen Myth”, The Tribune, 952006.

“Siachen was Almost a Done Deal in 1992”, The Hindu, 1062012.

Sumita

Kumar

“Trends in Indo-Pakistan Relations”, Strategic Analysis, vol.XXIV, no.2, 52000, p.229.

Kamla

“The Siachen Glacier Impasse”, Third Concept, vol.25, no.297, 112011, p.23.

Zeeshan

Haidar

“India, Pakistan Agree to Continue Siachen Talks”, Indian Express, 2852005.

“India, Pak Talk Siachen”, The Tribune, 162011. 31.

Kamla

n.28, p.23.

Parthasarathy

“India-Pakistan Relations”, in Atish

Shina

and Madhup

Mohta

ed., India Foreign Policy Challenges and Opportunities, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2007, pp.625-626. Also see

Amit

Baruah

“Manmohan: Wrong to Link Normalisation with Kashmir”, The Hindu, 2532006.

Satyabrat

Sinha

“The India-Pakistan Peace Process: Incremental Progress?”, in Anjali

Ghosh

, et.al eds., India's Foreign Policy, Pearson, Delhi, 2009, p.232.

“Closer to Final Point on Siachen: Narayanan”, The Hindu, 2142006.

Parthasarathy

“Pullout Will be a Himalayan Blunder”, The Tribune, 452006.

Rajeev

Sharma

“Siachen Ceasefire to Continue”, The Tribune, 2552006.

Verghese

B G

“Facts V/S Bluff on Siachen”, The Tribune, 2142012.

Noorani

A G

“Settle the Siachen Dispute Now”, The Hindu, 1162012.

Verghese

n.37.

Mehta

Ashok K

“Demilitarisation of Siachen”, The Tribune, 462006.