I

pdc

Political Discourse

2395-22292582-2691

Prof. R S Yadav

Kurukshetra, Harayana

pdc-2-2-006

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Issue of Jammu & Kashmir: A Realistic Analysis

Shukla

Subhash

¹Dr. Subhash Shukla, Asssistant Professor, Centre for Development Studies, University of Allahabad

1122016

225767

2016

IndianJournals.com

The issue of Jammu and Kashmir has bedeviled Indo-Pak relations since the partition of India in 1947. It has been seen by Pakistan as an unfinished agenda of Partition. Muchkund Dubey points out that the Pakistani leadership has gone about inculcating the belief that Pakistan as a state would not be complete until Kashmir becomes a part of it.¹ Similarly, Rajesh Basrur has asserted that Pakistan's inner turbulence and its determination to complete the task of Partition, as it were, by obtaining control of Kashmir thus became the centre piece of Islamabad's strategy.²

After Partition, Kashmir became the new symbol of the old struggle under the two nation theory. Pakistan claims that the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which has a Muslim majority, is a legitimacy of the two nation theory. Subrata K. Mitra states that however, challenging the Pakistani claim, India justifies her claim to Kashmir as evidence of the credibility and sustainability of her status as a secular state.³ As pointed out by Rajesh Basrur, India under Jawaharlal Nehru espoused a secular identity which sought to embrace its diverse religious and other social groups and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who led the movement for creation of Pakistan, sought political space for Muslims rather than an Islamic state. Hence he says, the tug of war over Kashmir essentially represented –and still does- the contest between these identities, with Pakistan claiming ownership of Kashmir because it is a Muslim - majority territory.⁴

Under the India Independence Act, 1947, the Princely States had been released from the paramountcy of the Crown, and, in law, made them independent. Heeding to the advice of Lord Mountbatten and yielding to the pressure of the circumstances as a result of Sardar Patel's statesmanship, all the Indian states, barring Hyderabad, Junagadh and Jammu and Kashmir, had acceded to one of the two dominions, India nad Pakistan. Maharaja Hari Singh did not take an instantaneous decision regarding the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Instead, he vacillated till a tribal invasion backed by Pakistan took place in October, 1947. He was forced to take a decision due to the insistence of the Indian government, on his request for military help from India to meet the exigencies of the tribal invasion, to first accede to India.⁵ Thereafter, he decided to accede to India.

Once the Instrument of Accession was signed by him, Lord Mountbatten, the British Governor General prevailed upon the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to agree to the provision relating to the wishes of the people being determined to be included in the Appendix of this agreement, on the following grounds, as pointed out by Appadorai and Rajan, that it was not forcibly thrust upon the King of Jammu and Kashmir⁶:

First, Lord Mountbatten had urged in the discussion that unless it was made clear that this accession was not just an act of acquisition, this in itself might touch off a war, and Nehru, thinking likewise, did not want a newly independent state like India to engage itself in a war with a neighbour.

Second, it cannot be too strongly urged that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was in the circumstances of that day not only a legal but a political accession, having the support of the strongest party of the state, the National Conference and its leader Sheikh Abdullah. Hence, Nehru had no doubt that a reference to the people would confirm the accession. Nehru, being a staunch democrat, agreed to the view of Lord Mountbatten as he was confident that the people of Jammu and Kashmir would go with India because the leader of the majority community of the state, Sheikh Abdullah was in favour of accession to India.⁷

Thirdly, having accepted the principle of plebiscite in the case of Junagadh, it was difficult for Nehru to refuse to accept it in a similar situation in Jammu and Kasmir.

The Indian armed forces, repulsed the tribal invasion and forced the invaders to retreat. However, India called for a ceasefire, without getting the entire area of the state under the control of the invaders evacuated. Probably, the Indian Prime Minister was worried about the interference of the Western Powers, especially Britain in the Indian subcontinent. Such a predicament could have brought the Cold War to this region. Fearing this and taking into account the danger of India's newly won freedom getting compromised, Nehru decided to take the issue of Jammu and Kashmir to the United Nations.⁸ According to J.N. Dixit, Nehru's expectation perhaps was that the manifest and incontrovertible aggression by Pakistan against Indian territory, confirmed and condemned by the United Nations, would strengthen India's political and legal stand on the accession of Kashmir. According to him, he also presumed that the United Nations’ pronouncements on the controversy would further preempt any further Pakistani moves against India's unity and territorial integrity. He approached the U.N. under Chapter VI of the U.N. Chapter, which deals with pacific settlement of disputes.

Critics have argued that India should not have approached the U.N. or it should have approached it under Chapter VII of the U.N. which deals with enforcement action.⁹ J. N. Bandyopadhyaya's view was that after committing the mistake of agreeing to a ceasefire without getting the entire area under the hold of the invaders evacuated, India had committed the blunder of approaching the

U.N. under Chapter VI. According to him, India's reference of the Kashmir issue to the UN under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which deals with the pacific settlement of international disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, etc. rather than under Chapter VII which deals with enforcement action, and her subsequent criticism of the UN, verging on denunciation, for the latter's inability to compel Pakistan to withdraw from so called Azad Kashmir, are self contradictory. Besides, under Chapter VI, the Security Council can only try to bring the two sides together through peaceful means of their own choice and can at best, “if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to apacific settlement of the dispute.”¹⁰ Therefore, he contends that in other words, a reference under Art.35 of the UN Charter inevitably made Kashmir a dispute of a political character; and in the context of the given state of international relations in particular, it was unreasonable to expect a quick settlement of the dispute by the UN in a manner satisfactory to India.¹¹

He felt that the international political situation being what it was at the end of 1947, it was prima facie unrealistic to expect that the UN would be able to settle the issue to India's satisfaction because international politics was fast becoming bipolarized, and Kashmir had a great strategic importance from the viewpoint of the Western powers. Furthermore, the UN was as yet an infant and experimental organization, heavily weighted in favour of the Western powers.¹²

His contention was that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was complete and legally final after the signing of the Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh. Therefore, if there was any cases for the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute it was for Pakistan to go to the U.N. If India had to go to U.N., then it should have asked for enforcement action against the tribal invaders for evacuation of the territory under their occupation.¹³

Bandyopadhyaya's contention was that there are aspects of our Kashmir diplomacy which got affected by Nehru's attempt to combine both idealism and realism in his policy towards Kashmir, and could have been different if dealt with by someone else. For example, although Sardar Patel was the Home Minister and responsible for the integration of the Indian states, it was Nehru who took over the Kashmir issue as Minister of External Affairs. The handling of the Kashmir question by Nehru rather than by Patel was one of the factors which created the impression that India herself regarded the Kashmir issue as an international dispute. Then, when the Maharaja of Kashmir, backed by the President of the Kashmir National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah, offered the unconditional accession of the state to India, it was Nehru's idealism which was responsible to make it conditional on the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁴

In defence of Nehru, it can be said that he had great faith in the U.N. as an international organization for promoting peace and security in the world. He felt that India's case was so strong that the U.N. Security Council would be able to exercise its influence and get the area under the occupation of Pak supported tribal invaders evacuated. However, when the U.N. Security Council started treating Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory. Nehru was dismayed and his confidence in U.N. got betrayed, particularly seeing the attitude of Britain &

U.S.A.15 Writing to his sister Vijayalakshmi Pandit, on 16th February, 1948, he observed, “ I could not imagine that the Security Council could possibly behave in the trivial and partisan manner in which it has functioned……………….US and Britain have played a dirty role, Britain probably being the chief actor behind the scene.”¹⁶

Thereafter, the United Nations passed resolutions for holding of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir and called for a withdrawal of the armed forces from there. On 13th August, 1948, the UN Security Council passed a resolution stipulating:

(i) there should be a ceasefire and complete withdrawal of Pakistani troops, nationals and tribesmen, (ii) that India should withdraw bulk of its forces after Pakistan had withdrawn all its personnel from Jammu and Kashmir, leaving a residual force to maintain law and order in the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, and

(iii) the future status of the state should be determined by a plebiscite.¹⁷ Nehru agreed to this resolution for the following reasons:¹⁸

First, this resolution recognized the fact of Pakistani intrusion into Jammu and Kashmir.

Second, it was a better resolution than a number of other draft resolutions which were considered at the Security Council, all of which were not only supportive of Pakistan but also aimed at giving its claim on Jammu Kashmir immediate legitimacy.

Third, the alternative would have been a general war with Pakistan in which that nation would have received large scale support from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Fourth, India still dependent for arms and oil supplies on Britain, found that soon after the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir the British started cutting supplies to India.

Above all, Nehru was convinced that once the Pakistani intruders withdrew completely, a plebiscite would confirm the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India because of the over whelming popularity of Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference in Kashmir.

The UNCIP (United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan) under the auspices of the U.N. was sent for the resolution¹⁹, however it was not successful. India was ready to withdraw its armed forces from Jammu and Kashmir and agreed to holding of a plebiscite thereafter, provided the area of Jammu and Kashmir under the occupation of Pakistan supported tribal invaders was evacuated. The U.N. authorities failed to exercise their influence and get this Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) evacuated. Therefore, India did not withdraw its forces and the plebiscite was not held. In the meantime, in the U.N. Security Council, India was only able to get the complete support of USSR, whereas U.S.A. and Britain supported the case of Pakistan. Hence, it can be said that the U.N. instead of getting the tribal invaders evicted from the area of Jammu and Kashmir under their occupation, as demanded by India, got it otherwise to become a disputed territory, which it was not under the provisions of India Independence Act. As Alan Campbell-Johnson says, “the legality of the accession is beyond doubt.”²⁰

Under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution it was provided that the state of Jammu and Kashmir was to have its own constitution within the Indian Constitution. Art. 370 cannot be abrogated or amended by recourse to the amending provisions of the Constitution under Art.368. For in relation to Jammu and Kashmir, Art. 368 has a proviso which says that no constitutional amendment shall have effect in relation to the state of Jammu and Kashmir unless applied by the order of President under Art.370. That requires the concurrence of the State government and ratification by its Constituent Assembly.²¹ Therefore, in 1951, elections were held to elect the representatives of the Constituent Assembly and which was successfully completed leading to the framing of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir in 1954.²² From the point of view of India, this exercise had been successful in determining the wishes of the people, to which P.M. Nehru had agreed to, as this was also representing the wishes of the people who had elected their representatives to frame a Constitution on their behalf. Hence, India felt that the demand for a plebiscite now had no substance.

Though it has to be said that in the meantime, the Western countries, particularly Britain, had been successful in persuading Sheikh Abdullah from supporting India, by promising him to be made the President of Jammu and Kashmir as an independent state.²³ This goes on to show the vested interests of the western powers in Jammu and Kashmir as a larger part of their strategy to control the growth of Communism in Asia. Therefore it can be said that due to the Cold War and the support of Britain and U.S.A. to Pakistan on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir in the United Nations Security Council led to the establishment of the dispute of Jammu and Kashmir, where Pakistan had no locus standi. The issue only was the withdrawal of the Pakistan supported invaders from the areas occupied by them. As Pakistan was their ally during the Cold War, being members of SEATO & CENTO, Britain and USA established the case of Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir where it had no case at all.

III

At the same time, the Pakistan ruling establishment has used the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, along with the general anti-India feeling after partition, to cement its stronghold in Pakistani politics from time to time. Especially, the Pakistan army has used the Kashmir issue along with the myth of India's agenda of undoing partition to strengthen its foothold in Pakistani polity. Rajesh Basrur says that as its army became increasingly entrenched in Pakistani politics, it developed a vested interest in sustaining hostility with India in order to justify its dominance.²⁴ It has fought the war of 1947, 1965 and the Kargil war in 1999. During the Cold War, the Pakistani military's links with the defence establishments of the Western countries got firmly established, particularly with Pentagon. After the 1962 Sino- Indian war and especially after the Sino-Soviet split in 1969 and thereafter the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, the Pakistani army's links got buttressed with the Chinese military establishment as well. Given the strong hold of the Pakistani military in their country's polity and their interference in it and the backing it enjoyed from the U.S., Britain & China for their own strategic interests during the Cold War, it had used the issue of Kashmir to its advantage from time to time.

Critics have pointed out that the then Indira Gandhi government lost a valuable opportunity because Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto succeeded in persuading Mrs. Gandhi to accept a clause in the agreement which acknowledged Jammu and Kashmir as an issue at dispute which had to be resolved bilaterally or by other mutually agreed means.²⁵ After the defeat of 1971 War and the establishment of Bangladesh thereafter, the Pakistani army has tried to avenge the defeat of this war by supporting and fomenting militancy in India in different parts of India, which could lead to secession. The classic examples, in this regard, being its support to pro–Khalistan militants in Punjab and the militants in Assam. After the solution of the problems of Punjab and Assam in 1980’s, the Pakistani military has tried to achieve revenge of its humiliation in 1971 war by giving full support to militancy and secession in Jammu and Kashmir, since the elections of 1987 of Jammu and Kashmir Assembly, where the people were not able to digest the victory of the corrupt regime of Farooq Abdullah once again.

Even after the restoration of democracy in Pakistan after the death of General Zia-ul-Haq, there was the presumptive hope that Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto would be able to deal with the controversial Kashmir issue without being subjected to the past prejudices and rigid attitudes.²⁶ Benazir Bhutto could not extract anything from Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on the Kashmir issue during his visit to Islamabad in 1989. Thereafter, the Pakistani ruling establishment, directly or indirectly, under the influence of Pakistani military supported cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.²⁷ The Pakistani army thrives and flourishes in Pakistani polity on the basis of tensions and conflicts between India and Pakistan and hence the disputed issue of Jammu and Kashmir suits its own vested interests. Probably, if there is peace between India and Pakistan, the Pakistani army would be in the barracks and not exerting its clout in its country's political ruling set-up.

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent coming closer of the U.S. and India after the disintegration of U.S.S.R. has had its own effect on the Kashmir issue. After the initial flip flop of the Clinton Govt. on J.K. Issue, by calling it a disputed territory where India's accession was questionable,²⁸ the U.S. government gradually started supporting a bilateral solution of this problem between India and Pakistan, ruling out any third party mediation. The shift in American thinking on Kashmir was clearly discernible when President Clinton in his visit to India in March 2000 outlining the US policy on Kashmir asked for the respect of the LoC (Line of Control); stopping of violence by third parties in Kashmir; to negotiate; and said that there was no military solution to the problem of Kashmir.²⁹ When General Musharraf indulged in the Kargil misadventure in 1999, the U.S. Govt. exerted its clout to prevent China and Saudi Arabia to support Pakistan during that war and also clearly stated its stand of not supporting it during the war, which ultimately led to a ceasefire.³⁰ Even during his Agra visit of 2001, President Musharraf insisted on first addressing the Kashmir issue before any other issue was addressed.³¹ By now, as Stephen Cohen observes: Terrorism is the core issue for India, Kashmir for Pakistan.³²

The coming to power of George Bush Jr. as President of U.S.A., and his intention of containing China by developing strategic partnership with India has had its own effect. Initially rocked by the incident of 9/11, which forced it to seek support of Pakistani government in its ‘war or terror’, but gradually it stepped up pressure on Pakistan to not to support cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir after the terror attack on Indian Parliament on 13 Dec. 2001. This led gradually to increased contact between the two sides of Kashmir, after the successful elections of J & K assembly in 2002. Thereafter, P.M. Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf tried to diffuse the tension and adopt a novel approach of solving this problem through joint management without redrawing the boundaries.³³ Rajeev Sikri points out that till mid 2007 or so, there were ongoing on back-channel discussions with Gen. Musharraf to try to produce a mutually acceptable compromise solution, which were to have the following elements- no territorial changes; soft borders; greater autonomy and self governance in both parts of Jammu and Kashmir state; a cross-Line of Control consultative mechanism and demilitarization of the State at a pace that would be determined by the decline in cross border terrorism.³⁴ Before, their efforts could materialize into something concrete, Gen. Musharraf had to leave power after a judicial verdict against him.

Thereafter, the Zardari Govt. came to power but its efforts of developing better relations with India were jolted by differences between him and the Army Chief Kayani and, ultimately, by the Mumbai terror attack on 16 Nov. 2008. Thereafter, Indo-Pak relations have been completely stalled because of the Pakistani government's inability to do something concrete on the issue of cross border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly against the perpetrators of this attack.

Recent efforts by P.M. Narendra Modi after coming to power by inviting Nawaz Sharif on his swearing in vanished soon into thin air. Instead, the stone pelting movement by Pakistani supported elements and the terror attack of Pathankot air base and at the army camp in Uri have forced the Indian government to not only indulge in surgical strikes and renew its claim on Pak occupied Kashmir, besides drawing the attention of the global community over human rights abuses in Balochistan to counter the propaganda of Pakistan on human rights violations by Indian armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir.

Over the last decade or so, the closer relations between India and the U.S., ever since the agreement on Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal, has at the same time seen even greater bonhomie between China and Pakistan in an already existing all weather friendship. The investments made by China in infrastructure projects in Pakistan occupied Kashmir as a part of One Belt One Road initiative has emboldened Pakistani authorities to stake its claim on Jammu and Kashmir through support to azadi supporting elements and Pro-Pakistani elements. At the same time, Indo-U.S. strategic relationship has emboldened the Indian authorities to indulge in such audacious moves such as surgical strikes in Pak occupied Kashmir upon terrorist camps.

Finally, the question arises as to where do this lead to in the context of the problem of Jammu and Kashmir. It has to be said that the solution to this intractable problem is not an easy task. Jha and Shukla point out that accepting the LoC as an international border is not possible because if this was acceptable to Pakistan, then this issue could have been resolved after the signing of the Simla Agreement. They point out that Pakistan wants the Kashmir Valley or it would like to see an independent Kashmir, which ultimately decides to merge with Pakistan and if not then remains under the hold of Pakistan. At the same time, they also agree that India, on the other hand, would never accept this situation wherein it has to lose Kashmir.³⁵ Then what could be the remedy. Is it what Rajiv Sikri says that the most realistic hope is that the two countries can manage the problem and when the time becomes right, solutions will emerge, as had happened with other long-divided countries like Germany and Vietnam?³⁶ If not, then the following measures should be taken.

Firstly, at the very outset, it can be stated that the power struggles of the Cold War and the strategic rivalries of that time led to the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, which was not a dispute at all. If the British and the U.S. had not supported Pakistan and had called for the withdrawal of the Pakistan supported invaders from Pak occupied Kashmir, then this problem could have been solved for once and for all. After all, with the end of Cold War and rise of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism they are now being forced to accept the Indian view point, which they had not done in late 1940s and early 1950’s due to their own strategic interests at that time. Hence, the responsibility lies with these major powers to realise the truth behind the problem and take measures to rectify their own mistakes.

Secondly, if the Jammu and Kashmir problem has to be solved there should be concerted efforts of the major powers of the world to rein in the Pakistani army. This has to be done by the western powers, particularly U.S.A. which has had a long standing influence over it. They should also try to curb the Chinese military establishment from supporting the Pakistani military in its adventure in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, the Pakistani army should be made to be confined to the barracks by these great powers who have tried to promote their rule in the past for their vested interests. India Pak relations, especially the Jammu and Kashmir issue, cannot be resolved unless the Pakistan army is forced to give up its anti-India stand and withdraw its support to terror groups in Jammu & Kashmir. This task can be facilitated if India gets the support of China as well besides the US.³⁷

Thirdly, any call for self determination in Jammu and Kashmir should be not be supported by Pakistani authorities, because it can prove to be counter productive for them in Balochistan, NWFP & Sindh as well. Malgovernance is a much bigger problem in Pakistan than in Jammu and Kashmir. If problems are due to malgovernance, then the solution lies in good governance and not secession. If the global community starts supporting secessionist movements in different parts of the world at the behest of vested interests of political and fundamentalist religious groups and institutions like the Pakistani army, then the world would be in chaos.

The most important lesson from this problem of Jammu and Kashmir for the rulers and politicians across the world is that power politics and strategic interests should not be allowed to dictate policies in such a manner that it leads to such disputes which ultimately lead to a situation as it exists in Jammu and Kashmir, from getting transformed from a no-dispute to a nuclear flashpoint. If the above mentioned measures are not taken, then unfortunately the worst fears of Gandhiji might prove to be true as he had stated on 4th January, 1948:

“Mistakes were made on both sides. Of this I have no doubt. But this does not mean that we should persist in those mistakes. For in the end we shall only destroy ourselves in a war…..”³⁸

Reference1

Dubey

Muchkund

, India's Foreign Policy: Coping with the Changing World, Pearson, Delhi, 2013, p.53.

Basrur

Rajesh

, India's Policy Toward Pakistan, in Malone

David

, Mohan

C Raja

, Raghvan

Srinath

(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2015, p.373.

Mitra

Subrata K

, Politics In India: Structure, Process, And Policy, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2014, p.268.

Basrur

Rajesh

, ‘India's Policy Toward Pakistan’, in Malone

David

, Mohan

C Raja

, Raghvan

Srinath

(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2015, p. 371.

Appadorai

, & Rajan

M S

, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, p.79.

Ibid., p.80.

Dixit

J N

, Across Borders: 50 Years of India's Foreign Policy, Picus Books, New Delhi, 1998, p.39.

Bandyopadhya

J N

, The Making of India's Foreign Policy, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1987, p.295.

Ibid., pp.295-96.

Ibid., p.296.

Ibid., p.294.

Ibid., p.295.

Ibid., pp.292-94.

15Dixit, J. N., Across Borders: 50 Years of India's Foreign Policy, Picus Books, New Delhi, 1998, p.40.

Ibid., p.40.

Ibid., p.41.

Ibid., pp.41-42.

Appadorai

, & Rajan

M S

, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, pp.83-95.

Ibid., p.80.

Noorani

A G

, Article 370:A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir, Oxford University Press, New Delhi,2011, p.6.

Basu

D D

, Introduction to the Constitution of India, Wadhwa Publishers, Nagpur,2002, p.257.

Dixit

J N

, Across Borders: 50 Years of India's Foreign Policy, Picus Books, New Delhi, 1998, pp.42-43.

Basrur

Rajesh

, ‘India's Policy Toward Pakistan’, in Malone

David

, MohanC Raja, Raghvan, Srinath(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2015, p. 372.

Ibid., p.113.

Ibid., p.197.

Ibid., p.199.

Shukla

Subhash

, Foreign Policy of India, Anamika Publishers, New Delhi, 2007, pp.49-50.

Ibid., p.255.

Ibid., p.252.

Ibid., p.282.

See

David M

Malone

, Does the Elephant Dance ?Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2011, p.110.

Shukla

Subhash

, ‘Indo-Pak Relations:Gujral to Manmohan Singh’, Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol.LXIX, No.4, Oct.-Dec. 2008, p.908.

Sikri

Rajiv

, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2013, p.45.

Jha

N K

, & Shukla

Subhash

, “India and Pakistan: Is there a Light at the End of the Tunnel?”, in Jha

N K

. & Shukla

Subhash

(eds.), India's Foreign Policy: Emerging Challenges, Pentagon Publishers, New Delhi,2012, p.171-172.

Sikri

Rajiv

, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2013, p.40.

Jha

N K

, & Shukla

Subhash

, “India and Pakistan: Is there a Light at the End of the Tunnel?”, in Jha

N K

. & Shukla

Subhash

(eds.), India's Foreign Policy: Emerging Challenges, Pentagon Publishers, New Delhi,2012, p.171.

See in Sikri, Rajiv, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2013, p.47.