Vivek Mishra & Udayan Das

pdc

Political Discourse

2395-22292582-2691

Prof. R S Yadav

Kurukshetra, Harayana

pdc-4-1-003

RESEARCH ARTICLE

India in South Asia: The Regional Paradox

Mishra

Vivek

¹Das

Udayan

¹Dr. Vivek Mishra, Assistant Professor, Netaji Institute for Asian Studies, Kolkata²Udayan Das, Research Assistant, Netaji Institute for Asian Studies, Kolkata

162018

113344

2018

IndianJournals.com

Vivek Mishra & Udayan Das

India's growing presence in world politics beyond its shores is marked by a paradox within its immediate neighbourhood. While the neighbourhood bears immense importance for India's aspirations of having politically and economically cordial relations, its actions have rarely followed through with such expectations. Quiet contrary to extant trends in regional relations, India's growing economic and political clout has been effective in bettering relations with extra-regional powers, marked by its multi-level diplomacy. The paradox peculiarly depicts as to how glaringly inverse the perceptions regarding India are, in and outside its neighbourhood. While at the regional level, India is often tagged as a “big brother-bully”¹, the extra-regional powers find in India, an amicable and peaceful rising power coupled with a sense of stability reflected through its ‘world's largest democracy’ tag. The factors that shape this paradox are three-pronged: first, the reasons which complicate India's relations with its neighbours emerge exclusively from its locale - which is not the case with extra-regional actors. India's sui generis position apropos extra-regional powers in South Asia is validated by its distinctiveness: India does not share overlapping ethnicities like Nepal porous borders like Bangladesh, nor is it fighting over contested territoriality like Pakistan. Naturally, concerns are only based on objective mutual interests which are systemic in nature when it comes to states outside the region. Second, despite best of intentions, Indian interests have often been left unsecured and at the risk of being perceived as either aggressive or indifferent by its neighbours. India's size has had an obvious negative implication in creating such perceptions despite India's attempts at being a benign power. Third, India's actions with respect to most neighbouring states have further put it in a position where it has not only been unable to garner all-weather allies but also has faced troublesome situations. Its traditional high-handedness in dealing with smaller states like Nepal and Bhutan, its intractable conflict with Pakistan, fluctuating relationship with Bangladesh, deteriorating ties with Maldives, emerging trends in domestic resistance against Indian initiatives in Seychelles and strategic misfortunes in Sri Lanka partly due to India's traditional policy of intervention and partly due to Chinese entry in that country in a big way – have all combined to place India wanting for healthier neighbourhood relations.

The importance of the neighbourhood is paramount due to the very structure of South Asia, whereby every regional development, be it economic, political, strategic or social is bound to have an imprint on India. The direct implication of events happening around its neighbourhood on New Delhi can be best described by a phrase coined by SD Muni as the title of his book, “pangs of proximity”². As Shashi Tharoor writes, “India is the proverbial 298-pound gorilla on the beach, whose slightest step will immediately be seen by the skinny 98-pounders as proof of insensitivity, bullying or worse”³. On the part of its smaller neighbours, a trade imbalance favouring India can be marked as economic imperialism. Even a cordial relation with India is often used by the opposition in neighbouring countries to up the ante for anti-Indianism and claim their governments as sell-outs. This was politically played out in Nepal in the country's most recent elections with KP Oli translating anti-India sentiments into votes favouring him.⁴ India's intentions have also recognised the importance of a stable neighbourhood crucial for its own development and growth. The first clear articulation comes from the Gujral Doctrine, which lays out a framework for pursuing peaceful relations within South Asia. The first principle in turn talks about India having a “big heart”⁵. In its recent form, Prime Minister Modi has furthered the prospects of giving prime importance to the immediate neighbourhood through the “Neighbourhood First” policy and has also enhanced the significance of India's immediate neighbourhood in pursuing its “extended neighbourhood” policy.

The very sense of treading such a thin line reduces strategic benefits for India as the largest regional country and increases expectations of a magnanimous foreign policy vis-a-vis its neighbourhood. As such, a crucial binary regarding its policies is faced by India; between how India wishes to, or ends up, projecting itself in the region. If India adopts an assertive regional posture, it would certainly be perceived as a hegemon, whereas a policy of indifference would amount to more complex regional problems like ceding grounds to other extra-regional powers in its own backyard. India, thus cannot turn a blind eye towards its neighbourhood. This complex set of circumstances amounts to two perspectives; one, rests on the fact that it is an inevitability that India would have issues with its neighbours and it has to accept that fact and deal with it with a hope of bettering neighbourly relations, even as they are inextricably linked with India's past, present and future. This strand of thought argues that a peaceful neighbourhood would add to India's growth and stability.⁶ The second strand of thought rests on the fact that rarely do big powers have amicable neighbourhood and efforts to secure good neighbourly relations are not a pre-requisite but just a bonus⁷. This perception entails that India's present status and its current requirements in order to boost itself as a major power in the world can hardly be advanced and complemented by a complicated neighbourhood, comprising developing and least developed countries entangled in their own constraints. The strategically optimal thing for India to do would be to create a space for itself at the global high table involving other major powers and better its relations in particular with the likes of US, France, Germany and Russia. In what appears to complement its extra-regional ties, India is also looking east beyong South Asian waters to explore a role for itself in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially by bolstering its ties with the eastern states through its Act-East Policy.

For further exploring India's neighbourhood paradox, the following sections will analyse India's South Asian neighbours on individual basis by scrutinising their relations with India.

Afghanistan

Often quoted in the verses of age-old civilizational links and mutual understanding, India-Afghanistan relations post-2001 has been largely concerned with Afghanistan's reconstruction and stability after the overthrowing of the Taliban regime. It is vital to India's interest that a peaceful and democratic Afghan state sustains and any possibility of the resurgence of Taliban is kept at bay. India and Afghanistan have developed cordial relations over the last two decades with India emerging as the largest regional donor, fifth largest globally, alongside assistance in terms of infrastructural and capacity building.⁸ The Zaranj-Delaram highway, the Afghan Parliament built with Indian assistance and the recently inaugurated Salma Dam remain symbolic to India's assistance in Afghanistan. In the sphere of security, the two countries have established a strategic partnership in 2011 which commits to the training, equipment and capacity building of the Afghan forces. India has also been influential in building its soft power which has given a positive dimension to India's perception in Afghanistan among its people.⁹ However, what restricts the scope of India-Afghan relationship is primarily the geo-politics of the region. India's overland access to Afghanistan is restricted due to Pakistan. Overcoming this constraint, India's attempt to open up to Central Asia through the International North-South Corridor (INSTC), via Iran, is a fairly new route whose logistical viability is to be tested.¹⁰ The second issue that has surfaced in the recent times is the question whether India would deploy troops in Afghanistan, a proposition ruled out by the Indian establishment. The productivity and the viability of deploying troops is a different debate, but the Indian decision reveals the limits between India-Afghanistan relations which is hard to stretch beyond the present framework. First, India-Afghanistan relations not only depend upon the interests of the two nations but also involve a set of other actors- United States, Pakistan, Russia and China. Pakistan, which is crucially linked to the future of Afghanistan, is dismissive about any significant role for India in the war-torn nation¹¹. Although US under President Trump has been vocal about the presence and growth of terror sanctuaries in Pakistan, it is important to be considered that the latter is extremely crucial for US access to Afghanistan, making a drastic exclusion of Pakistan by no means possible. It is also hard to find a seat for India at the global high table of negotiations regarding the Taliban problem against the backdrop of the outfit's steady resurgence. While US is rallying with India in United Nations Security Council, it is also working with the Quadrilateral Coordination Group, along with Afghanistan, China and Pakistan. Even Moscow's emerging stakes in Afghanistan are aligning within its burgeoning triangle featuring China and Pakistan. In a nutshell, although the security risks of an unstable Afghanistan has severe fallouts for India, its role is restricted to being a financial and humanitarian aid-giver which albeit translates to soft power but carries little political stakes for the future of Afghanistan. The dilemma for New Delhi vis-a-vis its involvement in Afghanistan has been regarding its extent of commitment. In the past, India has rejected direct requests for arms supply from the Afghan government. However, with growing American pressure on involving India in Afghanistan with ‘boots on ground’ exacerbates its regional dilemma and likelihood of its growing regional paradox.

Bangladesh

The regional paradox in the case of India's relations with Bangladesh emerges from the symbolic distance two countries are separated by despite overlapping ethnicities, culture and linguistic commonalities. India and Bangladesh has always shared a complex relationship in spite of the proximity, cultural links and bonhomie. The relationship goes back to the very creation of Bangladesh which was assisted by India in its liberation war against West Pakistan. India was the first nation to recognise Bangladesh and argue for its legitimacy. However, with the arrival of military rule in Bangladesh, India relations with Bangladesh gradually lost ground, recovering only in the last decade. One of the most long-standing issues with Bangladesh has been concerning its porous border with India which has been a cause of illegal migration and cattle smuggling. Securing the borders and stopping the Bangladeshi territory from being used against India has been one of the prime interests of New Delhi. For this, a cordial arrangement with Dhaka is essential for the bordering states and the North East. River water sharing, another casualty of the partition, like the borders, is also an irritant in India-Bangladesh relations. However, in the past decade, New Delhi and Dhaka have come closer. The two landmark agreements have been to secure the Land Boundary Agreement and the Maritime Boundary Award, the later going in favour of Dhaka. India notes that Bangladesh, due to its strategic location would be a key player in its sub- regional arrangements like BIMSTEC and BBIN, signified by its engagements in sectors of counter-terrorism, defence and cultural linkages. India has also got stiff competition from China which has given pivotal importance to Bangladesh in its Belt and Road Initiative across South Asia. In spite of realising its deep interests and according deserved importance, alongside the growing trade, India's relations with its eastern neighbour might get stuck in a log-jam for two reasons. First, India's good relation with Dhaka is largely dependent on who is presiding Dhaka between its two deeply divided and opposing parties. The Awami League has been influential in taking the relations ahead while Delhi is sceptical about a change in regime. This dependency can be derailed with Bangladesh approaching elections by the end of 2018. Second, India's foreign policy has been subject to federal influence when it comes to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The casualty in the former's case is the Teesta River Water Agreement which has not seen the light of the day due to stern objections from the West Bengal Chief Minister¹². On the other hand, Bangladesh too, has the task to stand up to India in the fear of being claimed by its constituency as a “sell-out”. Even though India and Bangladesh have worked for the betterment of relations with growing mutual interests, the relationship is unlikely to blossom because of two reasons. One, it is a herculean task to overcome the spoils of Partition which are too enmeshed in the cases of New Delhi and Dhaka. Second, Dhaka assumes some continuity in its foreign policy outlook towards India irrespective of who wields the power. Moreover, with illegal immigration gaining a centre stage in national politics in India and gathering political uncertainty over the current incumbent in Bangladesh in the forthcoming elections, renewed challenges stare New Delhi-Dhaka ties.

Bhutan

Bhutan has been one of India's staunchest allies in the immediate neighbourhood sharing a special relationship. An erstwhile British protectorate, Bhutan's external security responsibilities were taken over by India with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in 1949, giving India the privileged position of being a party to guide its foreign relations and consult on defence affairs. In all these decades, Bhutan has gained the trust of New Delhi by being loyal to the latter's considerations in realms of security and armed conflicts by supporting it in the 1962 war with China and not allowing its territory to be used against the Indian establishment. However, with time and the changing realities of South Asia, the tried and tested relationship between India and Bhutan has been showing fault lines. The first signs came from the revision of the Treaty of Friendship that came in 2007, with the alteration of India's privileged status of not being a guide to Bhutan's foreign relations but working together for common interests¹³. The second jolt came with the recent Doklam crisis, whereby Indian and Chinese troops were locked in a face-off for over 10 weeks. Although the territorial dispute was between Bhutan and China, Doklam is largely perceived as a Sino-Indian tension, given New Delhi's stand for Bhutan's security. India's appropriation of the Doklam issue can be a reminder of Bhutan's apprehensions of being squashed as a buffer state between two giants. A further recent setback in the India-Bhutan relations has been the latter's backing out from the BBIN (Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal) Motor Vehicles Agreement due to its environmental concerns¹⁴. Beyond these symbolic strains, India-Bhutan relations are going through a churn because of the difficulties in its hydropower diplomacy. Selling power to India is vital to Bhutan's economic self-reliance, but with India reaching power surplus, the demands are dropping. Furthermore, India's arrangement of 30 percent grant and 70 percent loan at a heavy interest has set the debt soaring for the landlocked nation.¹⁵ Although India's “Neighbourhood First” policy accords highest importance to Bhutan, signified by being the first country visited by Prime Minister Modi, India needs to accord due respect to the ties according to Bhutan's terms, not a general yardstick, in order to sustain the relationship. While Bhutan's concerns about security are possible fallouts of being a small landlocked state between the two competitive giants, its concerns regarding environment and resources are exclusive to its self-sustenance. The recent Doklam crisis involving India, Bhutan and China also depicted that China might be pushing Bhutan to open direct diplomatic channels with it. Such repositioning of China-Bhutan relations might reduce India's influence with Bhutan and erode the confidence of India-Bhutan ties.

Nepal

Historically, India and Nepal have had the deepest of bonds, starting from an open border to equal treatment of citizens across the two states. However, cracks have been evident in the bilateral relations between the two. India's size, resources and power has always had an overbearing influence on Nepal's psyche, which has in turn steadily fuelled an anti-Indian rhetoric in Nepalese politics. During the monarchy, the anti-Indianism was carefully crafted by the rebels, while today, it has become an essential characteristic of its nationalistic overtone. To India's discredit, its Nepal policy has always considered the Himalayan state within the ambit of its sphere of influence having stakes in its internal politics. Things turned rough between the two with the proclamation of the constitution followed by the Madhesi blockade which was allegedly backed by India. Nepal was cut-out from immediate supplies which not only fuelled the anti-Indian sentiments but also pushed it into the Chinese fold, who were happy to reciprocate with no strings attached. India's aid in the post-earthquake reconstruction and Prime Minister Modi's dual visits in 2014 were largely overshadowed as KP Oli won the elections, backed by anti-India sentiments, becoming the new Prime Minister with a strong majority and a political merger with the Maoists. Although, India desires having a special relationship with Nepal, it has missed on more than one frontier to secure a stable ground for itself where it is not perceived as a bully. First, its special relationship comes with a patronising tone rather than a relationship marked by sovereign equality¹⁶. For a new republic like Nepal, the respect of its sovereignty and treatment on the basis of equality is of utmost importance and not interference in its domestic politics. Second, India has been faltering on the deliverables, hammering the trust factor.¹⁷ India's commitment to complete the old projects and implement the new ones in time would have a lot of implications on the future of India-Nepal ties. Third, India's high-handedness has given China the space to factor Nepal as an important partner and investment destination in South Asia which works both ways, whereby Nepal can diversify its relations and play the China card. The recent state visits have somewhat started the restoration process in bilateral relationship between India and Nepal but the orientation has altered. Nepal no more wishes to see India's contributions as dole-outs but rather reciprocal elements of a new relationship between equals. India on the other hand has the compulsion to perform or else the anti-Indian rhetoric would push the Himalayan state into the Sino-orbit while sharing the risks of an open border and the casualties of age-old civilizational and kinship ties.

Pakistan

Pakistan remains India's most serious security threat and foreign policy challenge for India. Apart from the four armed conflicts (1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999), the India-Pakistan relationship in the recent times is best captured through the lens of regular ceasefire violations, cross-border firings and terror attacks. India's pursuit of better relations with Pakistan in search of peace boils down to two reasons. One, to sustain peace with a nuclearized state on its borders and, two, solving the bone of contention between the two states since independence; Kashmir. But India's pursuit comes with a caveat that it would only be making efforts towards bettering the relations, or would even try to do so, once Pakistan stops the export of terror. India's approach comes from the fact that when it comes to relations with India, it is the Pakistani deep state and its components that pull the trigger. Even if India solves the hurdles with Islamabad, the power rests with Rawalpindi. Secondly, with every hopeful flurry of peace initiatives, a terror attack follows throwing the peace process in a limbo. India's Pakistan policy has thereafter been to dash the diplomatic channels and isolate Pakistan in the region and expose it internationally in order to put pressure on it for disbanding its terrorist links. However, in spite of such attempts, Pakistan seems to be an all-weather ally to China, has emerging new equations with Russia and despite some hard talk, has been indispensable to the US¹⁸. India, on the other hand, has jeopardised SAARC at the cost of isolating Pakistan. Given present circumstances, it is hardly expected that India and Pakistan would return to the negotiating table to recover a workable framework devoid of perpetual conflict. India's Pakistan policy is torn apart between two poles, one, believing that Pakistan needs to be answered in the language that they understand best, force. The surgical strikes were a component of this school of thought. Second, Pakistan should be pressurised enough diplomatically to mould their conduct, however, keeping the door to peace open. Beyond foreign policy options, an internal dimension between India and Pakistan that also plays out is the constant project of Otherisation which is also sometimes beneficial to the hyper-nationalist overtones of the two states while politicians pandering to such populist rhetoric in order to reap electoral benefits. India-Pakistan problem has been intractable for seven decades and a coherent Pakistan policy still eludes India. India's present courses for actions puts it on the defensive and vulnerable stance in terms of security. The conflict is largely the raw nerve of instability in South Asia as well.

Sri Lanka

India's relations with the island nation has seldom been bright. The Tamil Question has always been the factor looming large in the context of the bilateral relations since the 1980s, only to bring back the bitter memories of New Delhi burning its own fingers with the military and political intervention in the civil war followed by the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. New Delhi since then had not looked towards Colombo while the latter was bruising in its own civil war. Added to this internal dimension is an external variant in the form of increasing Chinese foothold in the island which has raised the strategic importance of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka lies at the centre of a crucial juncture, situated at the focal point of the Indian Ocean which serves a great node for the Chinese connectivity plans to ensure unhindered access to the sea. India now confronts two interests which are barely secured. First, it is in India's interests that the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka is resolved. Its recent importance was highlighted with Prime Minister Modi visit to the war-torn northern province of Jaffna. However, beyond visits and previous pull-outs from summits organised in Colombo in order to keep the federal balance right, India does not hold a seat in the political solution of the crisis. If India takes a high-handed approach, it can be accused of interfering in the internal politics of Colombo and be tagged again as the “regional bully”. Secondly, countering China in Sri Lanka would be both strategically and financially costly. In a recent proposition, it seems that India is interested to buy the Hambantota Airport, unpopularly known as the world's emptiest airport, in order to offset the naval advantage that China has gained by the access of a nearby port¹⁹. What adds to India's vulnerability is that like Bangladesh, India's fortunes with Sri Lanka to some extent are also linked with the present regime. Compared to former President Rajapaksa, incumbent President Sirisena has been more favourable to India than to China. However, with Rajapaksa's party winning the local government polls, India's uncertainties are back²⁰, especially with the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) still being in the pipeline. Coupled with an unholy combination of ethic and strategic issues, India's relations with Sri Lanka seem to be depending on external variables which are not in India's hand despite the stakes and intentions being high.

Maldives

Even a decade ago, India-Maldives had no strains in their bilateral relations. The two states had settled their maritime boundary after establishing diplomatic relations. Its growing relations were furthered by India-backed Operation Cactus, a successful military operation to offset a coup attempt against the then President Gayoom. However, India's Neighbourhood First Policy has had the least of its impact on Maldives which is shifting towards the Chinese sphere of influence from an erstwhile India-first policy. Aided by an internal emergency imposed in response to a court order to set former President Nasheed free, President Yameen has relied on unilateralism to secure an overture to China by keeping India at bay. A steady upswing in relations with China overlaps with Male's deteriorating relations with New Delhi²¹. While Maldives has become a lynchpin of China's Belt and Road Initiative, secured a Free Trade Agreement and been at the receiving end of heavy Chinese investments, India's premiere company, GMR has been shown way, its invitation for the Exercise MILAN has been declined while being repeatedly asked to stay away from interfering in the internal politics of Maldives. For India, Maldives bears immense strategic importance at the heart of the Indian Ocean, being at a striking distance from Lakshadweep Islands. One of the primary interests of having cordial relations with Maldives is to keep India's strong foothold in the Indian Ocean amidst the changing waves. India's Maldives policy since the crisis has been at the most symbolic with Prime Minister Modi skipping his visit to Male and New Delhi asking an end to emergency. This approach, of taking a normative democratic tone, might entirely push Maldives to China because not only would that restrict India's diplomatic outreach to Male but would also lend ground to China who are open to cooperate under the present conditions without being concerned about the level of democratic freedom. India might end up treating Maldives like Myanmar and make the same mistake of not keeping the diplomatic channels open and ceding ground to China at the crucial juncture of Indian Ocean.

Besides these major South Asian countries, even India's relations with smaller countries are not at their best. For instance, India-Seychelles relations took a hit when details about an ongoing secret negotiation regarding a possible Indian naval outpost in Seychelles became public. Much of the tension that followed created the impression that New Delhi's policy was in damage-control mode to salvage the deal as well as as cordiality in bilateral relations. After months of looming uncertainty, although the agreement to establish a naval facility at Assumption island in Seychelles by India seems to have been salvaged,²² much remains to be seen in how Seychelles’ domestic political opposition will play out.

The China Factor

The emerging presence of China has factored in for every relation that India is part of in South Asia. Establishing itself as a major power, China wants to convert its potential into partnerships across South Asia and the Indian Ocean, and in turn stepping into India's domain of influence. The fact that Sino-Indian relationship is also a high-voltage relationship characterised by episodic competition and conflict has added to the overall shift in dynamics of the region as they both the states seem to step on to each other's toes.

China's gradual emergence, and more importantly its acceptance as a regional player by the South Asian states can be viewed from three perspectives. First, China is a credible major power which wants to partner with the smaller states by providing considerable amount of infrastructural and developmental support. South Asian states, mostly among developing and least developed nations, are in need of investments and infrastructure at a faster pace which China is capable of providing. Second, Chinese partnership comes with no political strings attached and mostly doles out aids – only with long term implications realised little by smaller nations. No state likes interference in its internal politics and be told what to do. Beijing, to a large extent, has been neutral to the political system, being rather guided by interests. India, on the other hand, has often been entangled in the internal political dynamics of the states, due to geographical proximity, ethnic overlapping and cultural ties. India's selective and normative approach when it comes to regimes like Maldives is futile and unreasonable. Thirdly, the smaller states have started seeing China as a card to balance off India. In the absence of China, Indian supremacy in the sub-continent might have well become all- pervasive owing to its size, resources and growing economy. China gives them the leverage to push India and to reap rewards from both ends.

South Asia and Indian Ocean region is the arena where the New Delhi and Beijing are competing for influence23. India is entitled to geographic centrality as opposed to China being at the periphery. However, China's Belt and Road Initiative might very well strike off that advantage from India by linking all the states in the latter's neighbourhood into the multi-billion-dollar plan of transcontinental connectivity. The Belt and Road Initiative is not only changing the strategic balance of South Asia but also the entire Indian Ocean Region by eating into India's sphere of influence.

Conclusion

This complex matrix of India's relations in South Asia repositions it in the region vis-a-vis regional as well as extra-regional powers. This repositioning has required recalibrating relations at both the levels. Regionally, this repositioning will require India to mitigate its perceived high-handedness apropos its South Asian neighbours while still improving its relations with major powers present in this region. Outside the region, India will have to enhance its ambit of relations on either side of its peninsula. As mentioned, India's relations in South Asia represents a paradox; one that is representative of an increasingly complex relationship with its neighbours while it has an improving relationship with the West, led by the US, as also the EU and UK. This paradox requires at least a squaring off of an over-tilt towards extra-regional major powers in the favour of improving neighbourhood relations. One of the ways to do so would be a seamless integration of India's neighbourhood and extended neighbourhood strategies through effective actions and trust building. Although India's Pakistan challenge remains a formidable challenge to overcoming its regional paradox, multilateral interactions through forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and a resuscitation of SAARC process do provide the glimmer of hope.

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