The philosophers who draw a distinction between fact and value and emphasize their mutual irreducibility must assign value an ontological status which would be different from that of fact. Facts exist independently of us, value being different from fact must be somehow dependent on us. This would establish some form of subjectivism of value. On the other hand, the philosophers who believe otherwise, i.e., those who believe that the distinction between fact and value is not absolute, would provide a factual basis like facts. This amount to a kind of ethical objectivism. Philosophers who identify value with a fact or somehow find out factual basis of value may be broadly divided into two groups — naturalism and non naturalism. Naturalism is the thesis that moral value can be identified with natural property that belongs to or reproduced by an action. On the other hand, Moore's distinction between fact and value is qualitatively different from the distinction which Hume drew between the two. John Searle, or neo — naturalist, has converted Hume's thesis by demonstrating that a descriptive premise or bunch of descriptive premises can entail an evaluative conclusion.
Moore, Hume, John searle, Naturalism
